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I. INTRODUCTION
Rebekah Blankers took her five-month-old daughter to the
hospital after observing that her head looked misshapen.1
Rebekahs fears were confirmed when a computerized
tomography (CT) scan of Gabriellas head showed
craniosynostosis, a rare genetic defect where the skull bones
fuse prematurely, leaving no room for the infants brain to
grow.2 Without treatment, intracranial pressure can build and
1. Caroline Chen, Insurers Slash Specialty Hospitals to Keep Premiums
Low, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2014-02-06/insurers-slash-specialty-hospitals-to-keep-premiums-low.html.
2. Id.; Press Release, Seattle Childrens Hospital, Seattle Childrens
Hospital Treats 125 Patients in January Who Lost Contracted Access Through
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cause blindness, seizures, brain damage, and death.3 Long-
lasting facial deformities can obstruct breathing, permanently
deform the head, and pose speech and language challenges.4
Craniosynostosis may also signal underlying genetic conditions
that can lead to heart problems, feet deformities, and
developmental delays.5
Rebekahs family was covered by a Premera health
insurance plan that she had purchased on Washington States
Health Benefit Exchange during the 2014 open enrollment.6
Yet, Premera initially declined to reimburse the hospital for the
CT scan.7 The hospital, Seattle Childrens Hospital, was out-of-
network and the Premera plan only covered unique care at
Seattle Childrens, that is, care that could not be performed by
an in-network provider.8 For example, a CT scan or blood work
might not be reimbursed if provided at Seattle Childrens while
a specialized surgery not capable of being performed elsewhere
might.9 Premera later agreed to cover all Seattle Childrens
care for two months for Gabriella, but then only cover unique
services.10 Because it was still open enrollment period on the
exchange, Rebekah transferred Gabriella to a more expensive
health insurance plan that covered Seattle Childrens in-
network, while keeping the remainder of the family on the
cheaper Premera plan.11 Rebekah did not feel that Premeras
plan could provide appropriate health care for Gabriella
[u]nless [she] went out of state, out of network, or out of
pocket.12
Washingtons Health Benefit Exchange (Jan. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.seattlechildrens.org/media/press-detail.aspx?id=523620.
3. Craniosynostosis, MAYO CLINIC (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.mayo
clinic.org/diseases-conditions/craniosynostosis/basics/complications/con-200329
17.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Chen, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id. I use provider in the broadest possible sense to encompass a
hospital, health system, physician, or other health care professional unless
otherwise specified.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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Seattle Childrens provides a number of unique services
not available in other area hospitals (like cancer and
transplant care) and also handles most tertiary and acute care
for the state.13 How would a plan that did not cover such a
hospital serve Gabriella who might require frequent
hospitalizations and heart, neurology, vision, rehabilitation,
and genetics specialists all coordinating her care? Without
Seattle Childrens being in-network, Rebekah and Gabriellas
doctors would have to continuously justify why any given
procedure was unique and unavailable elsewhere or,
alternatively, Rebekah might need to take her daughter to a
number of different institutions for her care, some perhaps
hours away.14 Arguing that such fracturing of care might lead
to coordination, quality, and safety issues, particularly for
patients who require tertiary care, Seattle Childrens has
challenged the state agency approving Premeras plan for a
review of whether it offers its enrollees adequate care.15
13. Id. For purposes of this Article, I will often refer to care based on its
level of complexity. For this Article, I adopt the following definitions. Primary
care is [b]asic or general health care traditionally provided by doctors trained
in: family practice, pediatrics, internal medicine, and occasionally gynecology.
Secondary care is the medical care provided by a physician who acts as a
consultant at the request of the primary physician. Tertiary care is
[s]pecialized consultative care, usually on referral from primary or secondary
medical care personnel, by specialists working in a center that has personnel
and facilities for special investigation and treatment. Tertiary Care
Definition, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/patient
_care/pay_bill/insurance_footnotes.html (last visited July 17, 2014). Acute care
is all promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative or palliative actions,
whether oriented towards individuals or populations, whose primary purpose
is to improve health and whose effectiveness largely depends on time-sensitive
and, frequently, rapid intervention. Jon Mark Hirshon et al., Health Systems
and Services: The Role of Acute Care, 91 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 386
(2013), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/5/12-112664.pdf.
14. See Chen, supra note 1 (Unless I went out of state, out of network, or
out of pocket.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Press Release, supra note 2. In the first month of the exchanges being
operational, Seattle Childrens reported that it treated approximately 125
former patients who had lost coverage as a result of purchasing insurance on
the exchange. Id. On behalf of these 125 patients, Seattle Childrens filed over
200 exceptions with insurance companies for which it was out-of-network
seeking coverage for the care the hospital provided them. Id. As of January
2014, the majority of the requests were outstanding, twelve had been paid for,
and eight had been denied. Denials included Gabriellas case (later
temporarily overturned), [a] 2-year-old with a neck mass that could have
been a dangerous infection or a tumor, and [a] teenager suffering from
mitochondrial disease, a rare disorder that requires treatment from a variety
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At the close of the first enrollment in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) health insurance
exchanges, it is increasingly clear that the Blanker familys
experience may not be unique.16
Consumers17 purchasing health insurance on both state-
and federally-run exchanges are finding that affordable
premiums may come at the cost of restricted provider choice.18
So-called narrow networks are increasingly popular in
individual, small group, and large group insurance markets as
a means for insurers to curb premiums and compete for
business.19 As PPACA regulations limit medical underwriting
and homogenize insurance offerings, insurers are agreeing to
of specialists. Id. All of these cases raise concerns about how to coordinate the
care of a patient requiring a variety of different specialists, when the care is
not being provided in a single health care system or hospital. The Vice
President of Medical Affairs at Seattle Childrens tells of a two-year-old who
required hernia surgery, had the surgery scheduled at Seattle Childrens, and
then later had it cancelled because Childrens was out of network. Their
referral to an in-network hospital failed, however, when the in-network
hospital informed them that they do not perform surgeries on two-year-olds.
Mark Del Beccaro, Vice President Med. Affairs, Seattle Childrens Hosp.,
Address to the NAIC Network Adequacy Model Review (B) Subgroups
Regarding Revisions to the Network Adequacy Model Act 3 (June 5, 2014),
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_rftf_namr_sg
_140605_seattle_childrens_hospital_testimony.pdf. These stories will become
increasingly familiar, we will discuss, as insurers compete for cheaper
providers that may not be able to fulfill the needs of tertiary care patients.
16. See Press Release, supra note 2.
17. Throughout this Article I will use terms like enrollees, insureds,
consumers, or patients. As Kinney notes, such terms are meant to encompass
the broad swath of the public that is intimately concerned with health care.
These terms are meant to demarcate where the individual is currently at in
the process. I use enrollee, consumer, or insured when speaking about the
time of insurance purchase or use of insurance, and patient when speaking
about the individuals role in a patient-physician relationship. ELEANOR
DEARMAN KINNEY, PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS 910
(2002). Many scholars have argued that these terms can alter public
perceptions about individuals claims to health care sometimes in harmful
ways. For a summary, see Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans
Satisfy Patients?: Problems with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance
Contracts, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 49192 (2004).
18. Robert Pear, Lower Health Insurance Premiums to Come at Cost of
Fewer Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09
/23/health/lower-health-insurance-premiums-to-come-at-cost-of-fewer-choices
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
19. Reed Abelson, More Insured, but the Choices Are Narrowing, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/business/more
-insured-but-the-choices-are-narrowing.html.
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nudge their patients to a narrow selection of providers in
exchange for better reimbursement rates and lower
premiums.20 This may mean wider availability of health
insurance for the public, increased enrollment for insurers, and
cost-savings across the health care system.21
In exchange for lower costs, narrow networks might mean
compromised choice and access issues for some patients.22
Seattle Childrens is just one example of how academic medical
centers are being frequently left out of narrow networks.23
Typically higher in cost, academic medical centers provide
important social functions like medical education, research,
and tertiary, acute, and other specialized medical care, which
are not traditionally performed at other types of institutions.24
The majority of consumers seem happy to trade extensive
provider choice in favor of lower costs.25 But, to the extent that
narrow networks compromise access to certain types of medical
care, are they appropriate and, if so, for whom?
Cases like Gabriellas illustrate the ethical dilemma. As
insurance becomes more affordable and mandated for
purchase, consumers are drawn to the best bargain.26 Yet, for
the unlucky few with a serious illness, narrow networks may
challenge their ability to access medically necessary, and even
20. See id.; see also Pear, supra note 18.
21. SABRINA CORLETTE & JOANN VOLK, NARROW PROVIDER NETWORKS IN
NEW HEALTH PLANS: BALANCING AFFORDABILITY WITH ACCESS TO QUALITY
CARE 10 (2014), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports
/issue_briefs/2014/rwjf413643.
22. Pear, supra note 18.
23. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER HEALTH RESEARCH INST., HEALTH
SYSTEMS DEVELOPING STRATEGIES TO CAPTURE NEWLY-INSURED 56 (2013)
[hereinafter PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER], available at http://www.pwc.com/en
_US/us/health-industries/health-insurance-exchanges/assets/pwc-provider-hea
lth-exchanges-09-18-13.pdf.
24. Tertiary care by its very definition presumes a single health care
system will be performing the care, because of the heightened need for
coordination and technology. Chapin White et al., Understanding Differences
Between High- and Low-Price Hospitals: Implications for Efforts to Rein in
Costs, 33 HEALTH AFF. 324, 325 (2014); see also Press Release, supra note 2
(But Dr. Melzer said the real concern is the potential lack of coordinated
care . . . . Studies have shown that such fragmenting of health care services
can negatively impact outcomes and increase cost.).
25. LIZ HAMEL ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING
POLL: FEBRUARY 2014 17 (2014), available at http://kff.org/health-reform/poll
-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-february-2014/.
26. Id.
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life-saving, care.27 Is it a just outcome if Gabriellas family
must pay significantly more for health insurance? If not, then
who foots the bill? And what if there are no plans offered on the
exchanges that contract with the tertiary providers most
appropriate for her condition?
Given their popularity and potential for cost-savings,
narrow networks may be here to stay.28 The PPACA and the
states regulate narrow networks through network adequacy
provisions, which require plans to provide reasonable access to
covered benefits through provider-to-patient ratios, geographic
limits, and other criteria.29 The federal government creates a
baseline upon which the states can build more stringent and
locally relevant guidelines that reflect their unique health care
markets and level of competition.30 With increased public
scrutiny and various legal challenges, state legislatures and
the federal government are examining their laws to see
whether more safeguards are warranted.31 Any regulation
must strike a balance between network innovation that could
curb rising premiums and a level of network adequacy that
delivers promised benefits.32
In this Article, I argue that narrow networks, in their most
extreme, create the very same access issues that the PPACA
attempts to eliminate. By sorting the population (and
insurance premiums) according to healthy and sick, they pose
distributive justice challenges, strain the goals of social health
insurance, and create barriers to care for those who most need
health insurance (the very sick who access tertiary care);
particularly if narrow networks continue to exclude academic
medical centers, as this first year on the exchanges has
foreshadowed.33 Narrow networks have the potential to create
two streams of health insurance: plans that are affordable,
narrow, and ideal for those with few health care needs, and
plans that are more expensive yet cover the types of providers
27. See Press Release, supra note 2.
28. See Abelson, supra note 19.
29. See SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 56 (2014), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2014/rwjf415649.
30. See id.
31. But see id. at 78.
32. See id. at 89.
33. See infra Parts V, VI.
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that very sick people need.34 Whether this is an ethically
supportable prospect depends on the role we expect health
insurance, post-PPACA, to play in society. While a true account
of all of the ethical challenges narrow networks raise is beyond
the scope of any single manuscript, my purpose is to highlight
that network adequacy poses a distributive justice problem
that is not currently adequately addressed in the law.
This Article presents an early examination of developing
network adequacy issues as they have unfolded on the
exchanges, with an eye toward establishing a minimum
threshold for access to tertiary care to inform state and federal
policymaking. Section II describes how PPACA provisions have
led to narrow networks as a new form of insurance competition.
In Section III, current data on narrow networks are discussed.
Current legal controversies and federal and state law will be
summarized in Section IV. In Section V, I argue that current
regulatory efforts do not reach to the full breadth of issues that
narrow networks create, particularly access to tertiary care and
questions of quality and coordination of health care services. I
raise two primary ethical issues which must be addressed: (1)
what counts as sufficient access, and (2) who is responsible for
paying for the health care costs associated with that access?
Lastly, in Section VI, I propose a number of practical,
regulatory, and policy considerations for legislatures and courts
that are attempting to balance the cost and access issues raised
by narrow networks.
II. ALTERED HEALTH INSURANCE COMPETITION
DRIVEN BY THE PPACA
The PPACA aims to improve access to health care, make
health insurance more affordable, strengthen social safety nets,
and enhance consumer rights and protections.35 It broadly
regulates the U.S. health care system, including public and
private health care financing and delivery.36 Of most relevance
to this Article are individual and small group market reforms
that alter competition among insurers.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See Health Care that Works for Americans, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform/healthcare-overview (last visited
Oct. 11, 2014).
36. See id.
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A. BUSINESS AS USUAL: MARKET COMPETITION LEFT
UNREGULATED
Health insurance was originally intended as a safety net
and a form of mutual aid for those individuals who encountered
devastating medical conditions.37 For a small and predictable
cost, larger and unforeseeable costs could be avoided.38 Social
and economic changes, and technological advances, drove
medicine out of the home and into the hospital where health
care was increasingly safer, more effective, and more valued.39
Today, health insurance occupies two primary roles: (1) a safety
net for significant and unpredictable health care costs like
cancer treatments or organ transplantation, and (2) promotion
of individual and population health by paying for preventive
services like check-ups (which may now also be too expensive to
be paid for out-of-pocket).40 Insurance is a cost spreader,
spreading the cost of risk across the individuals lifetime and
across society from families that have incurred the risk to those
that have not.41
But if the purpose of health insurance is to insulate
members of society from ruinous health care costs, unregulated
health insurance markets are maladaptive because they seek to
avoid the very people who need health insurance: the very
37. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse
Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 37273 (2003); John
V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 31219
(1997); Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion:
The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs,
50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 279 (2012); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul
of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 287 (1993).
38. See Baker, supra note 37, at 372.
39. See generally Christian Nordqvist, What Is Modern Medicine? MED.
NEWS TODAY (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/info
/medicine/modern-medicine.php (providing a historical timeline of changes
throughout medical history).
40. Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: Whats Insurance Got to Do with
It? Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM.
J.L. & MED. 436, 441 (2010) [hereinafter Health Reform]; Wendy K. Mariner,
Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS.
L.J. 199, 200 (2008).
41. Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and
the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L.
& POLY REV. 343, 353 (2013).
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sick.42 Insurers have to offset a number of market
imperfections like adverse selection (where individuals avoid
the cost of health insurance until they need it) and moral
hazard (where individuals seem to need and use insurance
more once they have it).43 Like team captains in gym class,
insurers try to stack the deck, picking the best players to offset
those few weak ones that they would never recruit
purposefully. In health insurance, this practice of allocating
health insurance premiums according to actuarial fairness is
done through medical underwriting.44 Healthy individuals are
wooed to market with low premiums and the sick are charged
higher premiums to offset their anticipated claims.45
Historically, insurers have used a variety of techniques to do
this: denying sick people coverage altogether; imposing pre-
existing condition, annual, or lifetime coverage limits;
heightening cost-sharing; and refusing to cover certain
procedures.46 This effect was felt most strongly in individual
and small group markets, where no pool was large enough to
spread the risk.47 Because health insurance may often mean
access to health care, health reform often attempts to mitigate
these behaviors.
B. PPACA REFORMS ALTER INSURANCE COMPETITION
The PPACA fundamentally alters insurance competition by
combatting the insurers desire to dodge risk.48 The law
42. Cf. Health Reform, supra note 40, at 440 (explaining that conventional
insurance relies on risk classification, a discriminatory process, to exclude bad
risks).
43. Baker, supra note 37, at 375; Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to
Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance Exchanges, 20 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POLY 237, 24243 (2011); Jacobi, supra note 37, at 37172; Deborah A.
Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS.
L.J. 11, 13 (1999).
44. Stone, supra note 37, at 287, 290.
45. See Baker, supra note 37, at 378. Baker analogizes the practice to
insurers picking peaches and avoiding lemons. Id. at 387 n.36; see also Tom
Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 160910 (2011) [hereinafter
Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility].
46. See Health Care that Works for Americans, supra note 35.
47. See id.
48. For a synopsis of primary insurance reforms, see SABRINA CORLETTE
& KEVIN LUCIA, THE LAUNCH OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IN SELECTED
STATES: REFORMING INSURANCE MARKETS AND PROTECTING CONSUMERS
2015] NARROW NETWORKS 73
promotes access by prohibiting individual and group health
plans from discriminating on the basis of preexisting
conditions.49 Insurers cannot refuse coverage based on health
status, medical condition (both physical and mental), claims
experience (the number of claims per patient), receipt of health
care, medical history, genetic information, evidence of
insurability (including domestic abuse), disability, and any
other health related factor determined appropriate by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.50 Insurance must be
guaranteed issue51 and guaranteed renewable,52 and waiting
periods for coverage cannot exceed ninety days.53 By virtue of
these changes, the cost that individuals pay for health
insurance will now depend more on their ability to pay than on
the amount of health care services consumed, and more on
current choices than on inherited or previously determined
health risks.54 To offset the extension of coverage for those
individuals with higher health care costs and to minimize risk
avoidance by insurers, the PPACA mandates that most legal
residents purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.55 The
(2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413041-The-Launch
-of-the-Affordable-Care-Act-in-Eight-States-Reforming-Insurance-Markets-
and-Protecting-Consumers.pdf.
49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
3 (2012).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
51. Id. § 300gg-1.
52. Id. § 300gg-2.
53. Id. § 300gg-7.
54. Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility, supra note 45, at 1597.
55. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A
(2012). This PPACA section describes a number of religious-based, poverty-
based, and other exemptions. Many found the mandate necessary to ensure
the viability of the exchange markets. By eliminating bans on pre-existing
conditions and annual and lifetime caps on coverage, costs increase and those
with higher health risks can view insurance as a bargain while those with
lower-risk may view the insurance as high-priced and of marginal value. Low-
risk individuals withdraw from the market and premiums must be raised to
account for it, leading to the dreaded death spiral of much renown with the
PPACA. To offset this potential flight from the market, the PPACAs
insurance mandate sets up a financial disincentive. For a detailed discussion
of the death spiral potential of the PPACA, see Seth Chandler, CBO Implies
Obama Regulation Shoveled $8 Billion to Insurers, ACA DEATH SPIRAL (Apr.
17, 2014), http://acadeathspiral.org/. For death spirals generally, see Jacobi,
supra note 37.
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purchase of insurance must occur during an open enrollment
period unless there is a qualifying event.56
To address affordability, the PPACA limits premium
variation in individual and small group markets.57 It
substantially reduces premiums for income-qualified
individuals and restricts cost sharing by enrollees, including
deductibles.58 Maximum out-of-pocket limits, however, do not
apply to balance billing, the costs that are paid out-of-pocket by
the enrollee for out-of-network care.59 Insurers are limited in
their profit-making abilities and must spend 80%85% of the
premiums they collect on the delivery of medical care to
enrollees, only keeping 15%20% of premiums as profit.60
Lastly, to ensure that benefits are adequate, the PPACA
requires all individual or small group markets to offer
minimum essential health benefits.61 Plans must be worth at
least 60% actuarial value and must fall into one of four
categories that signal their value (and thus potential out-of-
56. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e). This is to discourage free riders from signing
up only when they believe they need coverage. See id.
57. Rates may only vary based on family size, geographic area, age
(cannot vary more than 3-to-1 for adults), and tobacco use (cannot vary more
than 1.5-to-1). 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
58. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
18022(c) (2012). No cost sharing is permitted for any essential health benefits.
59. Balance billing for out-of-network care is explicitly excluded from the
definition of cost sharing and thus some out-of-network care may not be
considered in out-of-pocket maximums, actuarial values, etc. 42 U.S.C. §
18022(c)(3)(B). The PPACA does note that essential benefits provided out-of-
network must have the same coinsurance rate as in-network benefits, but as a
percentage rate, this could still mean a higher amount for individuals if the
total sum of the care is greater. Moreover, it is still unclear in the essential
benefits context if these out-of-network charges count in the overall out-of-
pocket maximum, actuarial value, etc.
60. Id. § 18003; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 18022. Essential health benefits are defined by the
Secretary but include at least the following items and services in these general
areas: ambulatory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization,
maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use services
including behavioral health, prescription drugs, rehabilitative services,
laboratory services, preventative and wellness services and chronic disease
management, and pediatric services (including oral and visual care). Id. The
Secretary conducts a review to ensure that the essential benefits mirror a
typical employer plan and will periodically monitor to assure and address any
gaps in coverage. Id.
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pocket costs) to the consumer.62 The PPACA also allows the
sale of catastrophic plans (high-deductible, low premium plans)
on the exchanges but only for individuals below the age of
thirty.63
In the face of a mandate to cover everyone regardless of
health status, the PPACA also discourages risk avoidance on
the part of insurers through risk adjustment,64 risk corridors,65
and reinsurance.66 The three Rs are designed to maintain
true competition in the health insurance market by promoting
consumer value in the form of covered benefits, quality of care,
and cost efficiency rather than how well an insurance
company avoids risk.67 Risk corridor and reinsurance programs
62. Actuarial values attempt to reflect the cost paid by the insurer versus
the enrollee. For example, with a 60% value, an average person can expect the
plan to cover 60% of all annual health costs while the patient will pay 40%
through deductibles, copays, and coinsurance. LARRY LEVITT & GARY
CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHAT THE ACTUARIAL VALUES IN THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT MEAN (2011), available at http://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8177.pdf. The four metal categories
include bronze plans (60% actuarial value), silver plans (70% actuarial value),
gold plans (80% actuarial value) and platinum plans (90% actuarial value). 42
U.S.C. § 18022(d).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(e).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 18063. Risk adjustment concentrates on the health of the
insurers enrollees, shifting money from plans with lower than average risk
enrollees to plans who insure enrollees with higher than average risk.
Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Health Insurance Exchanges
(Part 3), HEALTHAFFAIRS BLOG (July 13, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog
/2011/07/13/implementing-health-reform-health-insurance-exchanges-part-3/.
For thoughts on improving risk adjustment, see MARK A. HALL,
COMMONWEALTH FUND, RISK ADJUSTMENT UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT: A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS 69 (2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief
/2011/May/1501_Hall_risk_adjustment_ACA_guide_for_regulators_ib_v2.pdf.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 18062 (2012). Risk corridors focus on the insurers
predicted performance, shifting from those who had better experience than
anticipated to those who had worse experience. See Jost, supra note 64.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 18061. Reinsurance is a form of subsidy to support those
plans that cover high-risk individuals. See Jost, supra note 64; see also John
V. Jacobi, The Present and Future of Government-Funded Reinsurance, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 369, 38384 (2007).
67. Mark A. Hall, Risk Adjustment Under the Affordable Care Act: Issues
and Options, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 222, 227 (2011) (noting that risk
selection can be by chance or by design and can be accomplished by the
insurer or by the insureds selection). For example, insureds with predictable
health problems tend to select out of the networks that do not cover their
medical care or that require higher cost sharing, while healthier enrollees
tend to favor greater cost sharing. HALL, supra note 64. For thoughts on
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are only in place for the first three years of PPACA
implementation to help soften the blows from an unpredictable
market, but risk adjustment is a long-term aspect of the law
and was a fixture in regulating competition in the Medicare
Advantage and Part D markets.68 If risk adjustment works, it
strips from insurers the incentive to cherry-pick the healthiest
enrollees, as insurers will essentially lose those gains to poorer-
performing insurers.69 However, insurers will avoid cherry-
picking only to the extent that they believe that risk
adjustment will be accurate and properly calculated.70 At least
until insurers trust these mechanisms to account for their
losses, insurers may continue to avoid risk and favor healthy
enrollees to the extent that they are able to under the new
reforms.
What are the implications of new insurance competition for
the types of products being offered on the exchanges? The next
section will discuss narrow networks, the primary new model of
competition in the health exchanges.
III. NARROW NETWORKS AS A NEW MODEL FOR
INSURANCE COMPETITION
Success for an insurance company used to mean being the
best at avoiding risk.71 The PPACA alters competition through
disincentives to risk-select.72 But while insurers remain for-
profit creatures, they must find new ways to compete.73
Insurers skeptical of the precision of risk adjustment might
improving risk adjustment, see ERIC SCHONE & RANDALL S. BROWN, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., RISK ADJUSTMENT: WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE ART, AND HOW CAN IT BE IMPROVED 1823 (2013), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf407046.
68. NATL ASSN OF INS. COMMRS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND
HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1, 45
(2011), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-OP.pdf; see also Joseph
P. Newhouse et al., Steps to Reduce Favorable Risk Selection in Medicare
Advantage Largely Succeeded, Boding Well for Health Insurance Exchanges,
31 HEALTH AFF. 2618, 261820 (2012) (highlighting the role of risk
adjustment in the Medicare Advantage and Part D markets).
69. Newhouse et al., supra note 68, at 2618.
70. See id. at 261819 (The less effective risk adjustment is, the greater
the incentive for competing insurers to select good risks . . . .).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. NATL ASSN OF INS. COMMRS, supra note 68, at 3.
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continue to simply favor healthy enrollees.74 Direct
advertisement that is intended to draw in the healthy and
repel the sick is forbidden,75 but plans might achieve the same
results by offering the cheapest plan with the most minimal
benefits permitted by law or by offering high-deductible, low-
premium plans.
Insurers might try to attract larger pools of enrollees with
lower monthly premiums.76 As Jost explains, insurers cant
compete on benefits and cost-sharing, so you compete on your
prices and your network and your quality of services.77 If the
insurer can offer the cheapest or the best value plan, they
might attract a larger pool of enrollees overall and secure more
profits. And, as early data on the exchange suggests, a primary
way to compete via cost is through narrow networks.78
A. THE RATIONALE FOR NARROWNETWORKS
Many insurance companies are narrowing their networks,
increasing their ability to compete for better rates by agreeing
to contract only with a narrow group of providers.79 In return
for the insurers full market share of patients, providers drop
their reimbursement rates and the savings trickle down to the
enrollees as lower premiums.80 While a narrow network may
74. Id. at 15.
75. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(c)(1)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 18031 (2012) (requiring that insurance packages being offered on the
exchanges meet marketing requirements, and not employ marketing
practices or benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment
in such plan by individuals with significant health needs).
76. While medical loss ratios require the insurer to keep only a
percentage of their premiums for profits when compared with medical care,
the requirement is a percentage-based return, thus not discouraging insurers
from collecting larger pools of premiums overall. See supra notes 5861 and
accompanying text.
77. Patrick Connole, Providers Turn to Courts, Regulators for Relief as
Insurers Favor Narrower Networks, HEALTH PLAN WK. (AIS HEALTH) (Oct. 21,
2013), available at http://aishealth.com/archive/nhpw102113-02 (quoting
Timothy Jost). Jost reminds us of the history behind such regulated
competition based on the works of economist Alain Enthoven. See Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, The Health Insurance Exchange and Competing Visions of
Justice, LAHEY CLINIC J. MED. ETHICS, Fall 2010, at 4, 4.
78. See Connole, supra note 77 (discussing competition among insurers
through the use of narrow networks).
79. Id.
80. Joseph Burns, Narrow Networks Found to Yield Substantial Savings,
MANAGED CARE (Feb. 2012), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives
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seem unattractive compared to broader choice, narrow
networks may introduce cost-savings that other models
cannot.81 Narrow networks come in multiple forms. Tiered
physician networks are less restrictive, assigning physicians
into preferred and non-preferred networks where the patient
has a choice to go to either tier, but cost sharing is less when
visiting a preferred provider.82 In the more restrictive narrow
network, patients are only allowed to see providers that are in-
network and care provided outside of the network will not be
reimbursed.83 Recall that balance billing is not prohibited by
the PPACA when a patient goes out-of-network and only a
handful of states prohibit out-of-network balance billing.84
The concept of a narrow network bears a resemblance to
managed care plans which rose in popularity in the 1980s and
1990s largely in response to rising health care costs.85
Controlling costs through limited networks was a hallmark of
managed care, like narrow networks, but managed care also
used administrative processes to review and restrict care.86
/1202/1202.narrow_networks.html; see also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29;
Abelson, supra note 19; Tracy Jan, With Health Law, Less-Easy Access in
N.H., BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news
/nation/2014/01/20/narrow-hospital-networks-new-hampshire-spark-outrage-
political-attacks/j2ufuNSf9J2sdEQBpgIVqL/story.html; Pear, supra note 18.
81. Promedica Health Systems, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 16,700
(F.T.C. Jan. 5, 2012); Connole, supra note 77.
82. AM. MED. ASSN, TIERED AND NARROW PHYSICIAN NETWORKS 1, 2
(2006), available at http://www.wsma.org.asp1-3.dfw1-1.websitetestlink.com
/Media/PRC-pdfs-Operations/PO_P4P_AMA_Tiered%20_Narrow_Networks
_0606.pdf.
83. Id. This is limited in some regards. For example, most states prohibit
balance billing in the context of emergency care. State Restriction Against
Providers Balance Billing Managed Care Enrollees, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(2013), http://kff.org/private-insurance/state-indicator/state-restriction-against
-providers-balance-billing-managed-care-enrollees/.
84. Forty-nine states prohibit balance billing for health maintenance
organization (HMO) enrollees with in-network expenses; however, only
thirteen states prohibit the same for out-of-network balance billing. Twenty-
seven states have a ban on balance billing for in-network care through
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), with nine states forbidding out-of-
network balance billing in that context. State Restriction Against Providers
Balance Billing Managed Care Enrollees, supra note 83.
85. Vickie Yates Brown & Barbara Reid Hartung, Managed Care at the
Crossroads: Can Managed Care Organizations Survive Government
Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 2527 (1998).
86. Eleanor Kinney outlines four major areas of reform in response to
managed care that were meant to protect patients: (1) limits on networks that
might challenge patient access, (2) restrictions on utilization reviews, (3)
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Both models present similar policy challenges around how to
handle population-based health care while accounting for the
interests of individuals,87 and both face(d) similar backlash
around limited provider choice, the implications of this limited
choice for quality, consumer skepticism about whether their
medical care is being determined based on medical
appropriateness or cost,88 and a pushback by patients whose
long-term physicians were no longer covered in their
networks.89
restrictions on management measures that involve strict coverage
determinations, and (4) restrictions on financial incentives to limit care. As
this shows, managed care presented a number of broad access issues that go
beyond those raised by narrow networks, but the network concern remains.
KINNEY, supra note 17, at 11. For a summary of legal responses to managed
care at both federal and state levels, see generally id.
87. William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance
Coverage: Trompe LOeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49, 51
(1998) (presenting the legal and ethical challenges of managed care).
88. For an interesting argument about how managed care can support
patient trust in health care, see generally Bradford H. Gray, Trust and
Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, 16 HEALTH AFF. 34 (1997).
89. For a discussion of some of the challenges faced by managed care with
respect to small networks, see Karen A. Jordan, Managed Competition and
Limited Choice of Providers: Countering Negative Perceptions Through a
Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 875,
90001 (1995) (arguing for imposing legal standards on managed care to
enforce quality in their recruitment of providers). Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article, both managed care and narrow networks implicate
antitrust laws and whether insurers can exercise their market power in
bargaining for the best rates with hospitals. Ball Meml Hosp., Inc. v. Mut.
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1986). In Ball, hospitals tried to
sue Blue Cross Blue Shield for excluding them from a newly developed PPO
program. Id. Judge Easterbrook held that exclusion of these hospitals was not
in violation of the Sherman Act because even monopolies can drive hard
bargains and use their market power to create good deals for themselves, so
long as they came by that power lawfully. Id. at 1331, 133739. Judge
Easterbook looked to Indiana law, which required plans to not discriminate
unreasonably against or among providers where differences in price among
individual negotiations with hospitals or price differentials due to geography
or specialty did not constitute discrimination. Id. at 1341. Judge Easterbrook
noted that if an insurer could not cut out of its system the high-price
providers . . . there would be no reason for hospitals to bid against one another
for inclusion. Id. at 1343.In a similar case where Blue Cross used its market
power to barter for lower premiums for its customers, the court found no
Sherman Act violation because Blue Cross has done no more than conduct its
business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the best deal possible
which it then passes down in savings to its customers. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1973). Though the use of market
share in this way may pose a challenge to other commercial insurers, the goal
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Managed care fell out of fashion either in response to
increased state and federal regulation or employer
preferences.90 Broader networks brought increased premiums
(around an 11% increase per year) until the concept was
reintroduced with the PPACA regulatory environment and
another pushback against rising health care costs.91
Narrow networks may be a response to local market
conditions as well as predicted market instabilities driven by
the PPACA and the challenge of predicting the risk of the
previously uninsured.92 Some narrow networks may simply be
trying to offset hospitals increasing ability to raise
reimbursement rates, as their market control increases with
employed physicians and expanded practices.93
Understanding the insurers rationale for contracting with
only some providers, as well as which providers they select and
why, is critical. Some health insurers may only contract with
efficient providers, sorting providers based on the resources
they use per episode of care, demographics, and diagnoses.94
Such measurement might favor physicians who use fewer
of antitrust is to protect competition, not particular competitors. Jack A.
Rovner, Monopsony Power in Health Care Markets: Must the Big Buyer
Beware Hard Bargaining?, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 857, 86063 (1987). Similar
arguments and conclusions would likely apply to any similar claims brought
against narrow networks.
90. Sage describes the frustration consumers felt with managed care
narrow networks, which were selected for unrevealed but presumably
economic reasons. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and
the Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and Collective Health
Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 516 (2008).
91. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 2.
92. For example, a study found several market conditions that promote
narrow networks include higher excess bed capacity, greater provider or
payor fragmentation, and more significant potential for growth from the
uninsured than from people who previously had coverage. MCKINSEY CTR.
FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, HOSPITAL NETWORKS: UPDATED NATIONAL
VIEW OF CONFIGURATIONS ON THE EXCHANGES 1, 3 (2014), available at
http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites/default/files/McK%20Reform%20Center
%20-%20Hospital%20networks%20national%20update%20%28June%202014
%29_0.pdf.
93. This is contrasted with public insurance, which typically establishes a
set rate that the provider takes or leaves. For example, differences between
payments for Medicare and private payment for the same hospital average
40% more, but can rise as high as 600%. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3.
94. See AM. MED. ASSN, supra note 82, at 24.
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resources for their patients, for better or for worse.95
Alternatively, insurers might simply select the cheapest
providers possible, raising quality issues.96
Alternately, some insurers may positively use their market
power to promote high-quality, cost-conscious care.97 For
instance, some insurers allow enrollees to go out-of-network
(and even out-of-state) to providers that have cost conscious,
value-driven clinical results.98 Lowes Home Improvement, for
example, has contracted with the Cleveland Clinic to provide
cardiac surgery for all of its employees or dependents and,
given their large national market share, their rate is still about
the same for a local procedure despite paying for travel, hotel,
and meals.99
Narrow networks vary by intentionality, as well. Some
insurers consciously impose a narrow network design while
other insurers simply establish a lower reimbursement rate,
which not all providers are willing to accept.100
Theoretically, narrow networks could be used as a tool by
insurers to continue to avoid risk (even in the face of PPACA
prohibitions) if healthy enrollees are naturally drawn to narrow
networks and the sick are not.101 While risk adjustment evens
out the playing field so that everybody carries some burden for
covering the sick, it does not adjust for those insurers who
95. Moreover, episode groupers are critiqued for failing to consider
comorbidities of patients, socioeconomic status of patients, patient adherence,
and inaccurate or incomplete descriptions of an episode of care partly due to
limitations of accuracy and specificity of medical claim systems. Id. at 35. We
expect physicians to monitor and be prudent with health care resources yet we
do not want physicians to undercut patient care solely in the name of saving
money. AM. MED. ASSN, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINION 9.0652 -
PHYSICIAN STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES (2012), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-me
dical-ethics/opinion90652.page.
96. See AM. MED. ASSN, supra note 82, at 4.
97. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3.
98. Id.
99. PepsiCo has a similar arrangement for its employees cardiac and joint
surgeries with Johns Hopkins. Burns, supra note 80.
100. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
101. See Newhouse et al., supra note 68, at 262426. This certainly makes
intuitive sense if an individual with a known serious health condition has to
choose a broader network to have their specialist or specialists covered or
their higher cost health care systems covered. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra
note 29, at 35.
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simply recruit larger pools of enrollees.102 In other words, if
narrow networks draw in large crowds of healthy enrollees, the
insurer might have to redistribute their premium dollars to
poorer performing insurers who attracted sicker enrollees , but
not the premium dollars they earned for recruiting more
enrollees overall. Thus, insurers are incentivized to craft the
plan that attracts the biggest pool of enrollees.103 If many
people are more interested in the cheapest plan than the one
that offers broader coverage (like tertiary care) then we might
see such plans pervade the market, and the enrollees who do
need broader coverage may be too small to make a difference in
the market.104 As the next section describes, this is exactly
what early data on narrow networks shows.
B. EARLY DATA ON NARROWNETWORKS
About three-quarters of all insurance companies planned
to and did offer a narrow network on the exchange in 2014,
compared with about half of plans before the exchange.105
Narrow networks are increasingly popular in employer plans,
as well.106
Nationwide for 2014, most consumers had a choice between
either a broad or narrow network on the exchange.107 But
narrow networks made up almost half of all plans offered on
the exchange, and 60% of urban markets.108 The current 2014
102. See supra notes 7780 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 7678 and accompanying text.
104. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
105. Of insurers polled, 69% predicted they would offer narrow network
plans on the exchanges in 2014. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note
23, at 13. Of fourteen state exchanges studied during the first operational
year, 78% of new individual insurers had some narrow network offering
(compared with only 42% of plans offering narrow networks prior to the
exchanges ). MCKINSEY CTR. FOR U.S. HEALTH SYS. REFORM, EMERGING
EXCHANGE DYNAMICS: TEMPORARY TURBULENCE OR SUSTAINABLE MARKET
DISRUPTION? 1, 6 (2013), available at http://healthcare.mckinsey.com/sites
/default/files/Emerging_Exchange_Dynamics_September_2013_FINAL.pdf.
106. Narrow networks rose in the employer market from 15% in 2007 to
23% in 2012. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
107. Broader networks were available on the exchanges to nearly 90% of
the U.S. population while narrow networks were available to about 92%. See
MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 92, at 2.
108. Of the 48% that were narrow network plans, 22% of plans were
narrow, 19% were ultra-narrow, and 7% were tiered. Id. at 4. The study
defines a broad network as 70% or more of hospital participation within the
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exchange market reflected some reluctance among large
insurers to enter the exchange market but also a wealth of new
individual market entrants.109 Levels of competition in the
market varied across the states, with some states having only
one insurer on the exchange and others having a multitude.110
Premiums are predicted to be between 13% and 17%
cheaper in most narrow networks, which could mean twenty-
nine to fifty-nine dollars in premiums saved per member per
month.111 Premium savings vary across markets, though, with
some predicting modest 4% savings and others predicting
savings as great as 53%.112
In return, narrow networks limit hospital choice.113 The
majority of narrow networks excluded at least one hospital
from their plan, and about half excluded a hospital from each
area, a narrow network as 31 to 70% participation, and an ultra-narrow
network as 30% or less participation. Id.
109. Approximately one-third of the insurers who previously operated on
the individual market chose not to participate in the exchanges for 2014, while
new individual insurers made up about 26% of the overall individual market
for 2014. MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 105, at 4.
110. The average number of competitors in any given market was 3.9 for
the 395 rating areas across the thirty-four states that used a federally
facilitated exchange. Gruber and Colleagues Call for More Research on Health
Plan Competition, PHYSICIANS FOR NATL HEALTH PROGRAM (May 20, 2014),
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2014/may/gruber-and-colleagues-call-for-more-res
earch-on-health-plan-competition. For example, in 2010, more than half of the
states had over half of their market dominated by a single insurer. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., HOW COMPETITIVE ARE STATE INSURANCE MARKETS? 1, 5
(2011), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01
/8242.pdf. There is significant variation in this regard. For example, on the
higher competition side, states like Colorado, Missouri, Pennsylvania, New
York, and Wisconsin have large insurers only accounting for 21 to 34% of
individual markets while Alabama and Indianas large insurers dominate 84
to 86% of the individual market. Id. at 78. The small group reflects similar
competition dynamics across the country. Id.
111. MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 92, at 7.
112. Aetna projects 1% to 4% lower premiums for its employer-based
narrow plans, compared with traditional plans, while Health Net of Arizona
predicts 10% to 20% cheaper rates and Blue Shield of California will have
prices 10% to 15% lower than standard plans. Burns, supra note 80. New York
States Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans projected that, if it were forced to
provide out-of-network coverage for exchange products, premiums would rise
nearly 30% as a result. Connole, supra note 77.
113. MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 92, at 1213.
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system they contracted with.114 Meanwhile, New Hampshire
had only one insurer on the exchange, which excluded ten of
the states twenty-six hospitals.115 This may suggest challenges
for enrollees if they are looking for coverage for a particular
hospital (whether tertiary or community) that is not
participating in any narrow networks. Also, while early data
suggests there may be no overall quality difference between the
care delivered in broad and narrow networks based on Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) hospital metrics,116
the types of hospitals included in broad versus narrow
networks differ markedly. Only 14% of acute hospitals
participated in ultra-narrow networks and these networks only
included academic medical centers in less than half of their
plans.117 Networks that included academic medical centers had
9% higher premiums.118 For example, [i]nsurers passed over
major medical centers in Chicago, Indiana, Kentucky, Los
Angeles, [and] Tennessee.119 While BlueShield of California
included 53% of state providers in its broadest commercial
network, the network excluded all five medical centers of
University of California as well as Cedars-Sinai in Beverly
Hills.120
114. Three quarters of narrow, silver plans excluded at least one hospital
from their network; 44% excluded at least one hospital from each participating
system. Id. The premium savings for such plans seemed to be around 13%. Id.
115. Jan, supra note 80.
116. Specifically, the researchers used available data of the following four
outcomes: thirty-day mortality rate for heart failure, patient experience
rating, clinical scores for surgery patient antibiotics delivery, and hospital
value-based purchasing score. MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 92, at 9. The value-
based purchasing (VBP) score is a composite score where 70% is earned
through twelve clinical measures and 30% is earned through eight patient
surveys. Id. While this is a good early detection of any relevant similarities or
differences, the authors admit that different researchers might use different
measurements and that differences might emerge through the use of such
different measurements. Id. For example, arguably antibiotics delivery and
myocardial infarction do not reach to the concerns I will raise about tertiary
care and persons with a broad variety of complex chronic conditions.
117. 96% of broad networks included an academic medical center,
compared with 40% of the ultra-narrow networks. Id. at 10.
118. Id.
119. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 23, at 5.
120. The Executive Vice President of Californias BlueShield suggested
that many insured or lower income individuals who would be purchasing
lower premium plans on the exchange do not live in Beverly Hills where
Cedars-Sinai is located. Pear, supra note 18.
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The sorting of academic medical centers and acute care
into broader networks with more expensive premiums may
have important implications for patient care, particularly
patients who require access to highly specialized and
coordinated medical care. A recent RAND study found that
these hospitals, in exchange for higher rates, were more likely
to be engaged in medical education; offer specialized, expensive
services typically associated with tertiary care hospitals; and
serve a higher percentage of low-income (and poorly
reimbursed) patients.121 But these same high-price hospitals
also used their size, market share, and inclusion in large health
systems to minimize insurers ability to negotiate for lower
rates.122 Overall, while higher-price hospitals performed better
on reputation-based quality measures like U.S. News and
World Report rankings, their performance on outcome-based
quality measures were generally not better than lower-price
hospitals and, sometimes, worse.123 However, these quality
measures may not account for the sicker patients that high-
price hospitals more often see, or may reflect poorer
performance on routine care while good outcomes in the
tertiary services that make them unique.124
C. IMPLICATIONS OF NARROWNETWORKS FOR PATIENT CARE
According to a recent Kaiser poll, half of patients prefer a
broader network with higher premiums and more provider
choice, while about one-third prefer a narrow network.125 The
preference for broader networks increases with age, higher
income, and access to employer-sponsored insurance.126 Lower
121. White et al., supra note 24, at 330. The RAND study involved a
comparison study of hospital price calculations for a set group of retired
autoworkers involving 24,187 inpatient hospital stays at 110 hospitals. Id. at
325. The resulting price indexes were then sorted into low-price hospitals
(with a price index of 0.77, amounting to thirty hospitals), medium-price
hospitals (index of 0.97, amounting to fifty hospitals) and high-price hospitals
(index of 1.30, amounting to thirty hospitals). Id. at 32526.
122. Id. at 330.
123. Id. at 32729.
124. Id. at 330. Another possibility is that high-price hospitals enjoy good
reputations among physicians, which are undeserved.
125. The remaining 12% were either undecided or would prefer something
else. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 25.
126. Only 47% of eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds preferred the broader
network, compared with 54% of the sixty-five and over crowd. Households
making less than $40,000 preferred broad networks only 44% of the time,
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income individuals without employer support for insurance and
the uninsured tend to favor narrow networks.127 Interestingly,
preferences for broad networks were malleable.128 When those
who preferred broad networks were told that they could cut
their premiums by 25%, preference for broad networks dropped
from 51% to 37%.129 With such findings, it is not surprising
that narrow networks are common on the exchanges,
particularly given their appeal to the uninsured and
purchasers of individual coverage. And given the correlation
between higher premiums and coverage of academic medical
centers, it is also unsurprising that they are the prime service
cut from plans.130
While narrow networks are clearly favored, consumer
recognition of narrow networks may be problematic, especially
among the newly insured. Almost half of persons reported
purchasing a narrow network option on the exchanges, but a
quarter of all persons purchasing on the exchange did not
understand it to be a narrow network when they purchased
it.131 Of these individuals who were unaware of their narrow
network, half of them were individuals who had previously
been uninsured.132 Overall, 40% of individuals purchasing any
type of plan on the exchanges would have preferred more
information about providers available in each network.133
Consumer understanding of the consequences of narrow
networks is key. The use of narrow networks, while saving on
premiums, may also lead to higher out-of-pocket expenses,
especially if a patient has a complex medical problem thats
being treated at a hospital that has been excluded from their
compared with households making $90,000 or more who preferred them 62%
of the time. The preference for broader networks was also heavily apparent in
those covered by employer insurance (55% favored), as opposed to the insured
or purchasers of individual coverage, who preferred it only 35% of the time. Id.
127. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 68 (pointing out that
evidence suggests such individuals are more accepting of narrow network
when choosing a plan than those with employer-based coverage).
128. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 25.
129. In the same scenario, the preference for broad networks among the
uninsured dropped from 35% to only 22%. Id.
130. See supra notes 11722 and accompanying text.
131. Individuals unaware of the breadth of their network were also more
than twice as likely to have been previously uninsured. MCKINSEY CTR., supra
note 92, at 14.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 15.
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health plan.134 One study projects that as many as three
million patients will experience unexpected medical costs for
going out-of-network each year.135 The study found that most
plans do not have an out-of-pocket maximum when a patient
goes out-of-network.136 With a risk of balance billing, some
patients may forgo necessary care because it is out-of-network
and consequently harm their health or require more costly care
later, while others might seek care with an out-of-network
provider and be subjected to bills and possible medical
bankruptcies.137 The patient may not even realize he or she is
going out-of-network, for example, if the in-network hospital
has out-of-network physicians delivering care.138
Narrow networks are a growing trend which may mean
lower premiums overall but higher premiums or out-of-pocket
costs for those who know they need access to academic medical
centers.139 Narrow networks are regulated for their availability
of providers but, as the next section will describe, the laws do
134. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 23, at 6.
135. Kelly A. Kyanko et al., Out-of-Network Physicians: How Prevalent Are
Involuntary Use and Cost Transparency?, 48 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1154,
1166 (2013). Out of 566 polled patients, 27% cited experience with a previously
known physician as their primary reason while 20% cited a recommendation
by family, other physician, or friend. Id. at 1164. 19% went out-of-network
because of a physicians skill, 9% needed care right away, 4% had no in-
network physician available, 4% cited convenient location, 2% knew the
service or specialty was not covered by their insurance, 2% stated that they
could schedule an appointment sooner with the out-of-network provider, 1%
sought a second opinion, and 14% gave other as their primary reason. Id. at
1164.
136. Id. at 1167.
137. CORLETTE & VOLK, supra note 21, at 1.
138. Id. at 34. See also supra notes 8385 and accompanying text.
Hospitals may sometimes have a hard time coordinating patient care to
guarantee that all providers are in-network. Hospitals and health plans make
exclusive contracts with providers for a variety of reasons, both limiting the
ability of the provider to be available to multiple hospitals or plans, and
potentially limiting the ability of the plan or the hospital to use other
providers for its services. Likewise, within the hospital, providers accept
varying types of plans. Coordinating a patients care to only include in-
network providers may be impossible if the hospital does not have a given
provider in-network for that type of care and/or based on scheduling, among
other reasons. TEX. DEPT. OF INS., REPORT OF THE HEALTH NETWORK
ADEQUACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, S. 1731-11, 80th Sess., at 1517 (2009).
139. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24.
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not consider the issue of tertiary accessthe primary provider
being left out of narrow networks.140
IV. REGULATION OF NARROW NETWORKS FOR
NETWORK ADEQUACY
The Secretary of Health and Human Services establishes
criteria for certification of health plans as qualified health
plans (QHP), before they can be offered on the exchanges
(whether federal, state, or jointly-run).141 Narrow networks are
regulated for network adequacy to ensure a sufficient pool of
providers for enrollees.142 The PPACA provides minimum
federal regulations for federally-run exchanges, while state-run
exchanges have the freedom to follow federal guidance or add
additional requirements.143
The following section details relevant federal and state
guidance, the challenges of applying these standards in
practice, and their shortcomings with respect to tertiary care,
as evidenced by current legislative and administrative efforts.
A. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The PPACA regulates network adequacy through two main
provisions: network adequacy and essential community
provider (ECP) rules.144 Both have roots in earlier federal
regulations and national standards.145
1. Network Adequacy
To be certified as a QHP, a plan must ensure a sufficient
choice of providers . . . and provide information to enrollees and
prospective enrollees on the availability of in-network and out-
of-network providers.146 The Department of Health and
140. See infra Part IV.
141. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
18031 (2012).
142. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(B).
143. Id. § 1311(d)(4).
144. Id. § 1311(c)(1)(B)(C).
145. Id.
146. Id. §1311(c)(1)(B). The rule elaborates that the network adequacy
standards must be consistent with § 2702(c) of the Public Health Services Act,
which allows the plan to limit enrollment to those who live, work, or reside
within the area of the networks plan and may, if too occupied by its
responsibilities to current enrollees, deny enrollment of new enrollees so long
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Human Services (DHHS) elaborated in 45 C.F.R. § 156.230,
saying that networks must be sufficient in number and types
of providers, including providers that specialize in mental
health and substance abuse services, to assure that all services
will be accessible without unreasonable delay.147 The
regulation does not specify whether sufficient choice can be
established by in-network providers or also by out-of-network
providers.148 Notably, network adequacy is about an
appropriate diversity of providers, not the services they cover;
the latter is a question of essential health benefits.149 But, in
essence, the rules can be read together to suggest that a plan
needs sufficient providers to deliver its essential benefits or any
additional ones promised to the beneficiary.
In the preamble to the final rule, DHHS acknowledged
that the network adequacy standard is intentionally broad to
allow exchanges significant flexibility to apply this standard to
QHPs in a manner appropriate to the States existing patterns
of care given that network adequacy standards should be
appropriate to States particular geography, demographics,
local patterns of care, and market conditions.150 DHHS feared
that too strict of a federal standard could misalign standards
inside and outside of the exchanges and threaten their
viability.151 A minimum standard could provide some baseline
and consistent nationwide protection for consumers.152
More comprehensive language such as reasonable
proximity of providers to enrollees homes or workplaces,
ongoing monitoring process, and out-of-network care at no
additional cost when in-network care is unavailable, was
rejected after public comment to better align with state
as this is done without respect to claims experience or health status. Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(c) (2012).
147. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2013).
148. This issue is presented below in the Seattle Childrens case. See infra
Part VI.C.1.
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(a)(3) (2013) (Nothing in this requirement
shall be construed to require any QHP to provide coverage for any specific
medical procedure provided by the essential community provider.).
150. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,866, 41,893 (proposed
July 15, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 15556).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 41,89394.
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regulation.153 States tend to provide more detailed and varying
standards, as will be discussed in the next section.154
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act of
1996155 and the 1997 Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities156 clearly informed the federal standards. They
provided more detailed and stringent requirements than the
current federal rules.157 For example, the NAIC provides more
food for thought on how network adequacy might be
measured.158 It requires that out-of-network care be made
available at no additional cost to the enrollees where in-
network providers are insufficient or unavailable to provide a
covered benefit159a standard that enjoyed strong support in
the public comments to DHHS final rules but was removed to
allow more state flexibility.160 NAIC standards also encouraged
insurers to publish information for enrollees about the
providers available in the network, procedures for making
referrals within and outside of the networks, efforts to monitor
adequacy, plans for continuity of care in the event of a contract
termination with a provider, and other administrative
153. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers,
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,419 (proposed Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 15557).
154. See infra Part IV.B.
155. NATL ASSN OF INS. COMMRS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
GUIDELINES: MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT 74-1,
74-4 (1996) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT], available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_table_of_contents.pdf (A
health carrier providing a managed care plan shall maintain a network that is
sufficient in numbers and types of providers to assure that all services to
covered persons will be accessible without unreasonable delay.).
156. PRESIDENTS ADVISORY COMMN ON CONSUMER PROT. & QUALITY IN
THE HEALTH CARE INDUS., U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1998) [hereinafter
CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS], available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/hcqual/f
inal/append_a.html.
157. See supra notes 15556.
158. See NAICMODEL ACT, supra note 155, at 74-4.
159. Id.
160. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers,
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,41819 (proposed Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 15557).
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information related to network adequacy.161 The NAIC Model
Act requires that standards be established for the selection of
in-network primary and specialty care providers.162
Importantly, the selection criteria must not allow a health
carrier to avoid high-risk populations by excluding providers
because they are located in geographic areas . . . [with] higher
than average claims . . . or health services utilizations.163 Even
more on point, they must not exclude providers because they
treat or specialize in treating populations presenting a risk of
higher than average claims, losses or health services
utilization.164
Similarly, the Consumer Bill of Rights provided that  [i]f a
health plan has an insufficient number or type of providers to
provide a covered benefit with the appropriate degree of
specialization, the plan should ensure that the consumer
obtains the benefit outside the network at no greater cost than if
the benefit were obtained from participating providers.165
More specifically, [c]onsumers with complex or serious medical
conditions who require frequent specialty care should have
direct access to a qualified specialist of their choice within a
plans network of providers. Authorizations, when required,
should be for an adequate number of direct access visits under
an approved treatment plan.166 The Consumer Bill of Rights
was particularly intended to protect persons from the damages
of catastrophic illness, especially vulnerable groups like
individuals with mental or physical disabilities, children, and
low-income patients.167 As the language of these latter
documents shows, special health care needs have been
considered in prior policymaking but were omitted from federal
rules to allow room for the states to regulate.
161. NAICMODEL ACT, supra note 155, at 74-4 to 74-5.
162. Id. at 74-6.
163. Id. at 74-7.
164. Id. (emphasis added). The NAIC Model Act goes on to explain that
this provision prevents plans from weeding out enrollees on the basis of
disease and cost; if plans to exclude providers in this way were allowed, such
plans could ultimately avoid high-cost patients who are receiving ongoing care
and who will not select a plan that fails to cover their current specialty
providers for that condition. Id.
165. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 156, at ch. 2 (emphasis
added).
166. Id. at ch. 2.
167. Id. at pmbl.
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2. Essential Community Providers
The second standard related to network adequacy deals
with the inclusion of ECPs in the plan.168 The concept of ECPs
arose during Clinton-era health reform.169 It responded to a
concern that insurers would avoid serving geographic areas
where the poor or their physicians were located.170 Similar
concerns were raised with Medicaid managed care later in the
1990s.171 As Jacobi explains, the need to carve out protections
for ECPs stems from historical efforts by managed care to avoid
covering a patient population that is typically expensive to
treat.172
The PPACA requires plans offered on the exchanges to
include within their networks essential community providers,
where available, that serve predominately low-income,
medically-underserved individuals.173 The PPACA refers to
certain safety net and community hospitals, noting that the law
does not require insurers to cover specific services, but rather
to contract with the providers.174 The plan must have a
sufficient number and geographic distribution of essential
168. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1311(c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 18031 (2012).
169. SALLY MCCARTY & MAX FARRIS, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY
INST., ACA IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS (2013),
available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013
/rwjf407486.
170. Id. at 2.
171. Id.
172. John V. Jacobi, Mission and Market in Health Care: Protecting
Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1446
(1997). While managed care value[s] efficiency, practice methods that reduce
utilization of high-cost modalities of care, well-developed quality measurement
systems, and integration with broad delivery systems, traditional providers of
the poor have often measured badly in these areas, given a complex patient
population with serious health and socioeconomic challenges. Id.
173. § 1311(c)(1)(C). Note that plans are required to contract with ECPs
but not other types of providers per § 1311(c)(1)(C). ECPs may include:
federally qualified health centers, certain entities receiving grants under the
Public Health Services Act including family planning and outpatient early
intervention for HIV, AIDS drug purchasers, black lung clinics, hemophilia
clinics, certain community hospitals, certain childrens hospitals, certain
cancer clinics, rural referral centers, and some critical access hospitals. Public
Health Services Act § 340B(a)(4)(A)(O), 42 U.S.C. §256b(a)(4) (2012). Also
included are some safety net hospitals, nonprofit hospitals, and hospitals
providing care to students. Social Security Act §1927(c)(1)(D)(i)(IV), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-8(c)(1)(D)(i)(IV) (2012).
174. § 1311(c)(1)(C).
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community providers, where available, to ensure reasonable
and timely access to a broad range of such providers for low-
income, medically underserved individuals in the QHPs service
area.175 ECPs are circularly defined as providers that serve
predominantly low-income, medically underserved
individuals.176 QHPs need not contract with an ECP that
refuses to accept the generally applicable payment rates of
such issuer.177
3. Other Relevant Federal Guidance
To help with transparency, a plan must share its provider
directory for online publication and provide a directory to
potential enrollees upon request, which notifies whether any
providers are not currently accepting new patients.178 There is
no requirement for how often directories must be updated.179
Similar to safeguards put in place during managed care,
QHPs must have an effective appeals process for coverage
disputes and must notify enrollees about available internal and
external appeals, state ombudsman, and other consumer
assistance for insurance appeal issues.180 The exchanges must
implement quality improvement strategies and oversee
enrollee satisfaction surveys, assessment and ratings of health
care quality and outcomes, and information disclosures.181
Satisfaction surveys may be a way of highlighting,
retroactively, if a network has an adequacy problem.
QHPs can be decertified on a federally facilitated exchange
if the issuer substantially fails to meet network adequacy or
ECP standards,182 and can appeal this decision through an
administrative hearing process.183
175. 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(a) (2013).
176. 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(c).
177. 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(d).
178. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(b).
179. See id. [R]ather, the rule suggests that Exchanges consider balancing
consumer choice with the issuers regulatory burden to comply. MCCARTY &
FARRIS, supra note 169.
180. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2719(a), 42 U.S.C.
300gg-19 (2012).
181. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311(c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(4),
42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
182. 45 C.F.R. § 156.810(a)(8).
183. 45 C.F.R. § 156.810(e).
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4. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Implementing
the Law
CMS has issued guidance for federally facilitated
exchanges to inform implementation of the PPACA.184 This
guidance is instructive for state-run exchanges but not
required, unlike the PPACA rules themselves.185 For 2014,
CMS used state reviews as well as commercial or Medicaid
accreditation and consumer complaints to monitor network
adequacy.186 Plans fell within a safe harbor if they could show
inclusion of at least 20% of ECPs in the networks region, as
well as offer contracts to all available providers of Indian
health care in the area and at least one ECP in each
category . . . in each county.187 For 2015, CMS reacted to
strong public criticism of narrow networks by increasing the
184. Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight & Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dept of Health & Human Servs., to Issuers on
Federally-Facilitated & State Partnership Exchanges 1 (Apr. 5, 2013),
available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance
/Downloads/2014_letter_to_issuers_04052013.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 7. The categories of required ECPs include Federally Qualified
Health Centers (FQHC) and FQHC Look-Alike Clinics, Ryan White
HIV/AIDS providers, family planning providers, Indian health providers,
Hospitals (including Disproportionate Share Hospitals, Childrens Hospitals,
Rural Referral Centers, Sole Community Hospitals, Free-standing Cancer
Centers, and Critical Access Hospitals), and other ECP providers (STD and
TB clinics, Hemophilia Treatment Centers, Black Lung Centers, and other
centers serving medically underserved and low income patients). Id. at 89.
There was an exception to the requirement to contract with at least one
category per county if the plan met the 20% threshold and submitted a
supplemental response describing how the applicants provider networks
provide access to a broad range of ECP types. Or. Ins. Div., ECP Supporting
Documentation Instructions and Supplemental Response Form, OR. DEPT
CONSUMER & BUS. SERVICES, http://www.oregon.gov/DCBS/insurance/insurers
/rates-forms/Documents/3-ECP_Supplemental_Response_Form.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2014). Plans that met at least 10% of ECPs in that area met
the minimum expectation if the plan provides as part of its application a
satisfactory narrative justification describing how the issuers provider
network(s), as currently designed and after taking into account new 2014
enrollment, provides an adequate level of service for low-income and medically
underserved enrollees. Letter to Issuers, supra note 184, at 7. A plan that did
not meet the 10% or 20% threshold needed to justify why their current
proposal was adequate for low-income and medically underserved patients and
how they would promote ECP participation in future. Id. at 8. Different
standards apply, like in the PPACA, for plans that primarily employ
providers. Id.
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stringency of its review.188 CMS is using a reasonable access
standard to determine network adequacy for federally
facilitated exchanges (states are free to use the same
standard).189 Special attention will be paid to providers that
have historically raised network adequacy concerns, including
hospital systems, mental health providers, oncology providers,
and primary care providers, though nothing explicitly
addresses tertiary care providers.190 CMS will monitor
consumer complaints and will be considering the best methods
to collect provider network information in the future.191 It may
consider a time or distance standard for future rules, like the
states.192 The 2015 plans are held to a higher standard for
ECPs, having to contract with at least 30% of ECPs in the
networks region (up from 20% in 2014).193
While more stringent with 2015 guidance, the federal
regulation is still meant to be a floor that cedes power to the
states to regulate according to their own particular needs.194
B. STATE REGULATIONS
State regulation began in response to managed care after
consumers became concerned about keeping their own
188. Letter from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight & Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dept of Health & Human Servs., to Issuers on
Federally-Facilitated Marketplaces 1, 14 (Mar. 14, 2014), available at
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads
/2015-final-issuer-letter-3-14-2014.pdf.
189. Id. at 18.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 43.
192. Id. at 18.
193. Id. at 19. The 2015 plan includes a good faith effort to contract with at
least one ECP in every category and all Indian health providers. Id. If the 30%
threshold is not met, the plan must provide a narrative explaining how the
plan provides an adequate level of service for low-income and medically
underserved enrollees. Id. at 20. Plans that only met the minimum threshold
in 2014 may be recertified if they satisfy the narrative justification. Id. CMS
projects little problems on this account, given that only one plan reported not
meeting the 20% standard in 2014. Id. Plans can satisfy this threshold by good
faith efforts to contract even if they do not meet the articulated percentage.
Good faith means terms that a willing, similarly-situated, non-ECP provider
would accept or has accepted. Id. at 19.
194. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers,
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310 (proposed Mar. 27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts.
15557).
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preferred doctors and having an adequate supply of physicians
that were selected based on quality and not cost-savings.195
State law is more descriptive, and often quantitative, in its
network adequacy regulations.196 Provider-to-patient ratio has
been a primary focus; the state designates a certain number of
primary or specialty care providers that must be in-network
per a set number of enrollees.197 States also regulate distance
to travel between recipients homes and provider offices198 or a
195. E.g., Brown & Hartung, supra note 85, at 3133.
196. Network adequacy provisions for offerings on the exchanges are to be
distinguished from purchasing of insurance across state lines, a possibility
never permitted before but now being considered both at federal and state
levels.
197. For example, Illinois requires one primary care provider per every
1000 patients in Illinois, and one general surgeon per 5000 patients. Illinois
State Partnership Exchange Blueprint Application, HEALTH CARE REFORM IN
ILL.WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU 7, http://www2.illinois.gov/gov
/healthcarereform/documents/health%20benefits%20exchange/11%2016%2012
%20blueprint%20application%20-%20final%20draft.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2014).
198. For 2015, Arkansas has thirty-mile requirements for enrollees with
respect to primary care providers, ECPs, and mental health/substance abuse
providers, and sixty-mile requirements for specialists. Letter from Ark. Ins.
Dept, to All Licensed Insurers, Health Maintenance Organizations, Fraternal
Benefit Societies, Farmers Mutual Aid Associations or Companies, Hospital
Medical Service Corporations, Natl Assn of Ins. Commrs, Producer and
Company Trade Associations, and Other Interested Parties 2123 (Apr. 11,
2014), available at http://www.insurance.arkansas.gov/Legal/Bulletins/9-20
14.pdf. Delaware has specific provisions that build on the federal standard,
e.g., ensuring that every enrollee has access to a primary care provider whose
office is located within 20 miles and no more than 30 minutes driving time.
Delaware State-Specific Qualified Health Plan (QHP) Standards for Plan Year
2015, DEL. DEPT INS., http://www.delawareinsurance.gov/health-reform/DE-Q
HP-Standards-PY2015-May2014-v1.pdf (last visited July 18, 2014). Providers
must also meet the states Medicaid standards for timely access to care for
certain types of care including general, specialty, maternity, and behavioral
health care. Id. Illinois follows the general federal standard but builds upon it
with very specific time and distance and provider ratio standards for a variety
of general and specialty care. Illinois State Partnership Exchange Blueprint
Application, supra note 197, at 67. Minnesota poses some interesting
additional language beyond the federal floor and the typical language about
provider ratios and time and distance standards. It requires the plan to have
appropriate privileged doctors across the hospital systems to allow for timely
admitting of patients and also ha[ve] available, either directly or through
arrangements, appropriate and sufficient personnel, physical resources, and
equipment to meet the projected needs of enrollees. MINN. STAT.
§ 62K.10(subdiv.4)(6) (2013). New Hampshire has been active in the network
adequacy realm after a single major insurer offered plans on the exchange
excluding ten of the states hospitals from its network for 2014. Health
2015] NARROW NETWORKS 97
particular number of providers to choose from within a given
geographic area.199 Some states rely heavily on retrospective
consumer complaints and reporting to identify any network
weaknesses.200
Some states have adopted the NAICs Model Act with
which NAIC encouraged compliance in a 2012 white paper as a
way for states to be in compliance with PPACA standards.201
Some states look to the federal regulation as a temporary
standard while others intend to use it (or some other national
standard) in the long-term.202 For example, the District of
Columbia has followed the federal rules with intentions to have
its own guidelines by 2016.203 States vary with respect to how
Insurance Marketplace Plan Management: 2015 QHP Application Process,
N.H. INS. DEPT (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.nh.gov/insurance
/consumers/documents/nhid_qhp2015app.pdf. For 2015, New Hampshire is
following a mix of federal standards and additional state expectations (e.g.,
time and distance standards) but has been reviewing its process through the
state legislature. Id.
199. New York follows the general federal standard with comprehensive
additional state standardsprovider ratio, time and distance, and the
inclusion of certain types of specialists. Invitation and Requirements for
Insurer Certification and Recertification for Participation in 2015, N.Y. ST.
HEALTH 2223 (Apr. 25, 2014), http://info.nystateofhealth.ny.gov/sites
/default/files/2015%20Invitation%20to%20Participate%20in%20NYSOH.pdf. A
plan must include a choice of three primary care doctors, and a choice of two of
each required specialist doctors for each county. Id.
200. Kentucky focuses on reporting, which may expose problematic
network adequacy issues over time. State Marketplace Profiles: Kentucky,
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-profile/state-exchange
-profiles-kentucky/ (last updated Nov. 11, 2013) (Issuers must submit
information on enrollment, denied claims, rating practices, cost-sharing, and
payments for out-of-network coverage to the KHBE, DOI, and HHS and
provide public access to the data. Issuers are also required to establish and
report on quality improvement strategies.).
201. The white paper recommended additional factors states might
consider in determining an adequate network including geographic
distribution of providers in the area, population density, time and/or
distance to access providers, and location of low-income, medically
underserved [] populations, while noting that the PPACA affords states
considerable flexibility in crafting standards that are best appropriate to their
interests. NATL ASSN OF INS. COMMRS, PLAN MANAGEMENT FUNCTION:
NETWORK ADEQUACY WHITE PAPER 1, 6 (June 27, 2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_related_wp_network_adequacy
.pdf.
202. E.g., State Marketplace Profiles: District of Columbia, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-profile/state-exchange-profiles-distri
ct-of-columbia/ (last updated Oct. 1, 2013).
203. Id.
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they monitor network adequacy from an administrative
perspective.204
Meanwhile, in many states, any willing provider (AWP)
statutes still stand,205 impacting network adequacy laws. A
number of states passed AWP laws in the 1990s and 2000s in
response to managed care.206 These laws require that the
health plan contract with any provider willing to accept the
terms of the plan.207 This typically comes down to whether the
provider is willing and able to accept the payment and patient
load of the plan.208 AWP laws may broaden patient choice of
providers but may weaken a plans market share and
204. A 1999 study related to network adequacy among Medicaid managed
care systems found that states had a variety of methods, some more hands-on
and some less, for dealing with network adequacy. Mary R. Anderlik & Wendy
J. Wilkinson, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Managed Care, 37
HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 120206 (2000). More paper-oriented approaches relied
on on-site or desk reviews of provider directories, networks contracts,
contracting process, and related paperwork. Id. at 120203. Others reviewed
member complaints, which was critiqued as being only reactionary. Id. at
1203. More pro-active approaches include on-site reviews and tracking
requests for services with available contractors. Id. at 120304. States also
have differing agencies responsible for and capable of performing various
aspects of the network adequacy and/or plan certification process. For
example, Illinois parcels the role of network adequacy review between the
Department of Public Health and the Office of Insurance. Illinois State
Partnership Exchange Blueprint Application, supra note 197, at 1415.
205. See Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, NATL CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/any
-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx.
206. Managed Care State Laws and Regulations, Including Consumer and
Provider Protections, NATL CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research
/health/managed-care-state-laws.aspx (last updated Sept. 2011).
207. Fred J. Hellinger, Any-Willing-Provider and Freedom-of-Choice Laws:
An Economic Assessment, 14 HEALTH AFF. 297, 297 (1995) (AWP laws require
managed care plans to accept any qualified provider who is willing to accept
the terms and conditions of a managed care plan.).
208. AWP laws are to be distinguished from mandated provider laws,
where an insurer that will pay a physician for a particular service must also
pay any other provider for that same service (for example insurers that
reimburse orthopedic surgeons for lower back treatment must also reimburse
chiropractors for treatment of that same condition). James W. Childs, You
May Be Willing but Are You Able? A Critical Analysis of Any Willing
Provider Legislation, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 199, 199201, 227 n.148 (1997); J.
Peter Rich & Susan M. Nash, An Overview of Insurance Payment for Health
Care Services and Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, in 2 HEALTH LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE § 18:7 (2014) (differentiating between mandated benefit
laws, mandated provider laws, and AWP laws).
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bargaining power and, in turn, may increase premiums.209
AWP laws can be contrasted with freedom of choice laws,
where a patient can receive care from providers that have not
even signed contracts with the plan.210 States may also have a
good faith contracting requirement which may require plans to
contract with a certain number or type of hospitals,211 or to
209. Naturally, hospitals excluded from managed care contracts have
advocated for these regulations while managed care companies have opposed
them, calling for freedom to contract with whichever providers they choose.
AWP laws are hotly contested, typically supported by health care providers,
and protested by insurers, employers, and trade advocates. See Thomas C. Fox
et al., State Any Willing Provider Laws: State Developments, in HEALTH
CARE FIN. TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 11.35 (2014). Advocates of AWP also
argue that such regulation ensures the highest quality of providers and
preserves patient choice of provider. Yet opponents counter that by
maintaining the ability to contract with only select providers, they retain the
market control and can thus better assure quality. The ability of managed
care companies to control cost through narrow markets may be over-
estimated. The only way AWP could completely neutralize the insurers
bidding war would be if physicians all banded together to agree upon bottom
ratesan activity which is, of course, illegal because of antitrust regulations
over price-fixing. Without the ability to band together, some physicians will
still worry about being excluded from the market and will be ready to barter
for lower reimbursement rates. See also William J. Bahr, Although Offering
More Freedom to Choose, Any Willing Provider Legislation Is the Wrong
Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 557 (1997) (Any willing provider statutes
undermine the incentive of the managed care organizations to set competitive
prices so their network will be the choice picked by employers. Without the
competition, the managed care organizations lose their ability to control costs.
Thus, a state that adopts any willing provider statutes will have less
competition among the managed care organizations.); Childs, supra note 208.
Disputes related to AWP laws are in the purview of the states, as the ERISA
savings clause saves them from federal preemption. E.g., Ky. Assn of Health
Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003). Administrative costs may also
increase with AWP laws. One study suggests as much as by anywhere from 34
to 52%, but scholars debate the certainty of this data. Sharon Reece,
Puncturing the FunnelSaving the Any Willing Provider Statutes from
ERISA Preemption, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 407, 41819 (2005).
210. Twenty-five states have some version of a freedom of choice law which
still runs the risk of exposing patients to high out-of-pocket costs, as the laws
only guarantee access to care, not reimbursement for it. These regulations are
only targeted at managed care typically and tend to carve out specific types of
providers, for example, pharmacies in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-3407, -
4209.1, -4312.1 (West 2010); Rich & Nash, supra note 208.
211. Illinois State Partnership Exchange Blueprint Application, supra note
197. Whereas in New York each plan must contract with at least one hospital
in each county and some counties require more than one hospital, based on
population density. Invitation and Requirements for Insurer Certification and
Recertification for Participation in 2015, supra note 199. Delaware requires
plans to contract with all federally qualified health centers. Delaware State-
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offer at least one plan on the exchange that includes their
broadest network of providers.212 This latter provision could be
important for tertiary care access, to ensure that at least one
plan is available for patients who need it, though it may not
ensure that such plans are affordable.
The process of defining network adequacy has been an
active one in the state legislatures as states race to catch up to
insurance innovation.213 Public and professional testimony on
network adequacy at state legislature and insurance
commissioner hearings has perhaps provided some of the more
interesting insights.214
Specific Qualified Health Plan (QHP) Standards for Plan Year 2015, supra
note 198.
212. Massachusetts is requiring insurers to offer plans on the exchange
plans in each of the four metallic tiers that include access to their broadest
network. Sarah Bushold, Senior Manager of External Affairs & Plan Mgmt.,
Mass. Health Connector & Ashley Hague, Deputy Exec. Dir. of Strategy &
External Affairs, Mass. Health Connector, Address at the Board of Directors
Meeting: 2015 Qualified Health and Dental Plan Seal of Approval (Mar. 27,
2013), available at https://www.mahealthconnector.org/HomePortal/content
/conn/UCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Content%20Folders%20for%20Conn
ector/About/Leadership/Board_Meetings/2014/2014-03-27/2015_SoA_Board
_Presentation_032714.pdf.
213. Connole, supra note 77 ([T]he health reform statute and
implementing regulations only broadly define network adequacy and plans
need to offer essential community providers. That basically leaves the
determination of network adequacy up to the states. And not only do states
standards differ, but they also are evolving.).
214. Maryland mainly follows the federal standard but has received
interesting comments from carriers about these and other standards including
that adequacy standards should focus less on mechanical time and distance
standards and more on access to appropriate, high-quality care, quality
metrics, and patient satisfaction. Carolyn A. Quattrocki, Interim Exec. Dir.,
Md. Health Connection, Address at the Maryland Health Benefit Exchange
Board Meeting: 2015 Plan Certification Standards (Mar. 18, 2014), available
at http://marylandhbe.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2015-Plan-Certifica
tion-Standards.MHBE-Board.3.18.14pptx.pdf. A bill is moving through the
Connecticut state legislature concerning network adequacy. See INS. & REAL
ESTATE COMM., JOINT FAVORABLE REPORT: AN ACT CONCERNING HEALTH
CARE PROVIDER NETWORK ADEQUACY, S.B. 392, 2014 Sess. (Conn. 2014),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/JFR/S/2014SB-00392-R00INS-JFR
.htm. Among a variety of requirements, the bill gives enrollees a choice of at
least five different primary care providers in their geographic region, requires
and monitors for good faith contracting efforts among both insurers and
providers, and requires special attention for the needs of individuals with
disabilities. Id. Testimony in favor of and against the bill is illuminating.
Benefits of the bill included protecting patients who face ever-lengthening
commutes to healthcare, maintaining long-term doctor-patient relationships,
preserving choice among providers, promoting patient access to trusted
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C. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
In addition to state and federal laws setting the standard
for what makes a network adequate,215 state insurance courts
are tasked with the challenge of using those laws to approve or
disapprove plans for listing on the exchange.216 In this context,
patients who are unsatisfied with their purchased plans and
providers who have been excluded from plans217 are creating a
flurry of activity in state legislatures and courts.218 These cases
unveil aspects of network adequacy that are important in
practice but not amply met by current network adequacy laws,
such as the issue of access to tertiary care as presented by
Seattle Childrens.
1. Seattle Childrens Hospital
Gabriellas story is part of a much larger controversy that
occurred at Seattle Childrens, a 250-bed nonprofit childrens
hospital providing tertiary and quaternary care to neonatal and
pediatric populations, in the first year of the insurance
providers, ensuring both timely and clinically appropriate care, promoting
transparency of networks for patients, and the process of contracting. Id.
Concerns raised included disrupting innovation in network delivery, limiting
available provider networks and plans, adding administrative burden to state
agencies, and the harms of regulatory uncertainty for the insurance industry.
Id.
215. See Ashley Noble, Insurance Carriers and Access to Healthcare
Providers: Network Adequacy, NATL CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 27, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-carriers-and-access-to-health
care-providers-network-adequacy.aspx#State_Laws.
216. Louise Radnofsky, States Try to Protect Health Exchanges from Court
Ruling, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2014, 6:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles
/states-try-to-protect-health-exchanges-from-court-ruling-1406328692.
217. Terry Baynes, California Consumers Say Duped by Blue Shields
Limited Obamacare Plans, REUTERS (May 15, 2014, 3:41 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/us-usa-healthcare-blueshield-idUS
BREA4E0VN20140515; Sandhya Somashekhar & Ariana Eunjung Cha,
Insurers Restricting Choice of Doctors and Hospitals to Keep Costs Down,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/insurers-restricting-choice-of-doctors-and-hospitals-to-keep-costs-down
/2013/11/20/98c84e20-4bb4-11e3-ac54-aa84301ced81_story.html; see also Jan,
supra note 80 (discussing dissatisfaction among newly insured New
Hampshire residents).
218. E.g., Somashekhar & Cha, supra note 217 (citing the Seattle
Childrens lawsuit as an example).
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exchanges.219 Seattle Childrens petitioned the Office of
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Washington (OIC) for a
review of its own determination that two health plans
excluding Seattle Childrens from network (BridgeSpan Health
Company220 and Premera Blue Cross221) are adequate.222
According to representatives from the OIC and relevant
insurers, the Premera plan was the only plan being offered on
the exchange for a number of Washington counties in 2014.223
219. Seattle Childrens Hospital, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://health
.usnews.com/best-hospitals/area/wa/seattle-childrens-hospital-6910560 (last
visited Oct. 18, 2014).
220. About Us, BRIDGESPAN, https://www.bridgespanhealth.com/web
/bridgespan_individual/about-us (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). BridgeSpan is an
exchange-based health insurer offering insurance in Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington. Id.
221. Fast Facts, PREMERA BLUE CROSS, https://www.premera.com/wa
/visitor/about-premera/fact-sheet/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). Premera Blue
Cross is a nonprofit Blue Cross Blue Shield health care provider and one of
the largest in the Pacific Northwest, servicing 1.8 million people in
Washington and Alaska. Id.
222. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Oct. 22, 2013) (demand for hearing) [hereinafter Demand for
Hearing], available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative
-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-sch-demand.pdf. A third
plan, Coordinated Care, was part of the original suit but has since contracted
with Seattle Childrens. Coordinated Care specifically designed its network as
a low-cost gap insurance for those thousands of individuals or families who
churn off and on Medicaid as their income changes. It was the lowest priced
package on Washingtons exchange for 2014. See Seattle Childrens Hospital,
No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014) (declaration
of Jay Fathi), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-fathi
-declaration.pdf. A fourth health insurer, Molina Healthcare of Washington,
Inc., later contracted with Seattle Childrens after Seattle Childrens
demanded a hearing, and thus their network adequacy is moot. See Beth
Kutscher, Seattle Childrens Settles Differences with Molina Healthcare,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20131023/BLOG/310239996.
223. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Dec. 2, 2013) (declaration of Christopher Blanton), available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-proc
eedings/documents/13-0293-bridgespan-intervene.pdf; Seattle Childrens
Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014)
(declaration of Jay Fathi), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rule
s/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-fat
hi-declaration.pdf; Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State
Office of the Ins. Commr Jan. 15, 2014) (declaration of Molly Nollette),
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings
/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-oic-dismiss-nollette-dec-1.pdf.
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Only one plan covered Seattle Cancer Care Alliance in 2014 on
the exchange, while at the time only three plans covered
Seattle Childrens.224 The cheapest plans offered on the
exchanges were the ones that typically excluded Seattle
Childrens from the network.225
Seattle Childrens argued that many patients, when sick,
will still present to their hospital regardless of network status
(and perhaps more acutely ill and in need of more expensive
services than if they had regular access to the hospital).226
Seattle Childrens may be unable to transfer such patients if
care is needed imminently, or may simply find referral
inappropriate if the in-network providers are not used to the
volume or severity of the cases.227 Seattle Childrens may have
no way to receive compensation for its services and, while
charity care can address this, it will mean fewer resources for
others in the community without insurance.228 The OIC
Premera has a contract with Seattle Childrens but Seattle Childrens disputes
the applicability of that contract to insurance plans offered on the exchange.
See Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the Ins.
Commr Jan. 15, 2014) (OIC staffs motion to dismiss demand for hearing and
to terminate adjudicative proceeding), available at http://www.insurance.wa
.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-02
93-oic-dismiss-motion.pdf.
224. Carol Ostrom, Obamacare Implementation in Seattle Draws Fire for
Excluding Seattle Childrens Hospital from Network, MEDCITY NEWS (Apr. 24,
2014, 6:00 AM), http://medcitynews.com/2014/04/obamacare-implementation
-in-seattle-draws-fire-for-excluding-seattle-childrens-hospital-from-network/.
225. See Amy Snow Landa, Childrens Hospital Sues State Over Exclusion
from Exchange Plan Networks, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 4, 2013, 3:50 PM),
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/healthcarecheckup/2013/10/04/childrens-hospital
-sues-state-over-exclusion-from-exchange-plan-networks/; Carol M. Ostrom &
Amy Snow Landa, Many Health-Exchange Plans Exclude Top Hospitals from
Coverage, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 19, 2014, 10:41 AM), http://seattletimes.com
/html/localnews/2022371201_exchangenetworksxml.html.
226. Demand for Hearing, supra note 222 (Many patients enrolled in
these exchange plans who require services available only at SCH are likely to
present for services at SCH, regardless of its network status, more acutely ill
and require more services, and more complex services when they present for
care.).
227. See Press Release, supra note 2.
228. Demand for Hearing, supra note 222 (These patients will consume
more resources, thereby reducing resources available for other SCH patients
and impairing the ability of SCH to serve the pediatric healthcare needs of the
region. SCH will, in addition, not be fairly compensated for these services
because of its exclusion from these exchange plan networks.).
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reviewed for network adequacy using the federal regulations as
well as two state laws.229
In an earlier case, the OIC had initially disapproved a
third plan, Coordinated Care, for not being adequate because it
had not contracted with pediatric hospitals and level 1 burn
units and was planning to spot contract (providing individual
agreements for services on an as-needed basis) instead.230
Coordinated Care appealed.231 Applying only state law, the
Chief Presiding Officer found the plan adequate because state
laws do not explicitly require that an insurer contract with all
burn units or pediatric hospitals in the area.232 In fact there is
229. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-43-200 (2014) requires a health carrier to
maintain each provider network for each health plan in a manner that is
sufficient in numbers and types of providers and facilities to assure
that . . . all health plan services provided to enrollees will be accessible
without unreasonable delay as well as adequate choice among [each type of]
health care provider[]. The statute allows sufficiency and adequacy of choice
to be established by a number of criteria including, provider-covered person
ratios by specialty; primary care covered person ratios; geographic
accessibility; waiting times for appointments with participating providers;
hours of operation; and the volume of technology and specialty services
available to serve the needs of covered persons requiring technologically
advanced or specialty care. NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 155, at 74-4. State
agency standards like that of Medicaid can be used to demonstrate network
sufficiency. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.46.030 (West 2013) requires, for
certification of health maintenance organizations, that they demonstrate that
their facilities and personnel are reasonably adequate to provide
comprehensive health care services to enrolled participants . . . .
230. Coordinated Care Corp., No. 13-0232 (Wash. State Office of the Ins.
Commr Sept. 3, 2013) (findings of fact, conclusions of law and final order) at
1617 [hereinafter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order],
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings
/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-oic-dismiss-nollette-dec-2.pdf ([T]he
OIC advised that its remaining concerns about [the network adequacy] issue
are 1) the Company has no massage therapists in its provider network; 2) the
Company has no Level 1 Burn Unit or pediatric specialty hospitals in its
network; and 3) the Company is not allowed to use spot contracts or single
payer agreements to complete its network of providers because, e.g., the
Providers under the Companys plan are prohibited from balance billing the
consumer (which those spot contract providers would do).).
231. Id.
232. Likewise, the statute allowed for similarity to a Medicaid plan to be
evidence of network sufficiency, and this plan was almost identical to the
already-approved Medicaid plan. See id.; Coordinated Care Corp., No. 13-0232
(Wash. State Office of the Ins. Commr Nov. 15, 2013) (order on OICs motion
for reconsideration) [hereinafter Order on OICs Motion], available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-pro
ceedings/documents/13-0232-reconsideration-order.pdf.
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no requirement that these types of facilities must be included
in-network at all, so long as the care is ultimately accessible to
the patient.233 Coordinated Care presented testimony that 99%
of all services could be covered in-network, while unique
services could be offered through spot contracts.234 Spot
contracts were ultimately permitted, so long as patients were
informed that they are protected from balance billing in the
event of a spot contract.235 This unique care standard is what
could lead a patient like Gabriella to require care from a
variety of different providers without coordination.
In the present case, Seattle Childrens argued that
BridgeSpans and Premeras networks are inadequate
according to both federal and state standards because the plans
have failed to include sufficient ECPs and have failed to
provide essential health benefits including pediatric services.236
The OIC admitted that Seattle Childrens is an ECP, as the
only pediatric hospital in King County and as the provider of
services that are unique in the state and the Northwest
region.237 In terms of uniqueness, Seattle Childrens claims to
have provided the following for the state of Washington in
2012: 100% of kidney and liver transplants, 81.7% of all age
zero to fourteen pediatric inpatient discharges within a thirty
233. Order on OICs Motion, supra note 232 ([O]n cross examination the
OIC agreed, correctly, that these rules do not specifically require the Company
to include Pediatric Specialty Hospitals and Level I Burn Units in its network
[Testimony of Kreitler] but that WAC 284-43-200(1) requires that the
Company maintain each plan network in a manner that is sufficient in
numbers and types of providers and facilities to assure all health plan services
to covered persons will be accessible without unreasonable delay.).
234. See id.
235. Coordinated Care pointed to other established network contracts that
had been permitted to use spot contracts in the past via OIC. Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order, supra note 230. It also pointed to
language in WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.46.030 (West 2013), which explicitly
permits the use of out-of-network providers so long as the consumer is not
placed in a worse position. Id.
236. See Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014) (motion for partial summary judgment), available
at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial
-proceedings/documents/13-0293-sch-msj-motion.pdf.
237. Id. (There is no dispute here that SCH is an essential community
provider; the OIC has admitted this . . . . There also can be no dispute here
that SCH, the only pediatric hospital in King County, providing multiple
services that are unique in the state and Northwest, is providing essential
health benefits.) (citation omitted).
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mile radius, 90% of all pediatric ECMO procedures, 90% of
pediatric bone marrow transplants, 70% of all pediatric heart
surgeries in the state, 75% of all pediatric psychiatry
inpatients, 81% of all pediatric inpatients generally, and 90% of
all high acuity inpatients in a thirty mile radius.238 Notably,
Seattle Childrens uniqueness is about the quantity, as well as
range, of its services.
Seattle Childrens challenged the use of spot contracts for
the over 50,000 patients that are being covered by these
plans.239 They pointed to data suggesting a very low rate of
actual use of spot contracts, insinuating that health plans may
not be as generous at covering unique services as they now
indicate.240 Seattle Childrens argued the lack of in-network
status has already caused harm to patients and administrative
burden for Seattle Childrens.241 The OIC and insurance plans
countered that neither the federal nor state regulations on
network adequacy require inclusion of a specific provider,
regardless of their preeminence or sympathetic patient base or
their level of experience.242 The plans argued that, according to
238. See id.; Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of
the Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014) (declaration of Michael Madden), available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-pro
ceedings/documents/13-0293-sch-msj-madden-declaration.pdf.
239. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 29, 2014) (opposition to intervenors joint motion for
summary judgment), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-sch
-opposition.pdf.
240. In 2012, spot contracts occurred in only 67 cases out of 351,147
patient encounters (a rate of 0.02%) and in other years spot contracts have
been in the single digits. See id.
241. In January 2014, Seattle Childrens had to add three full time
employees to process paperwork with Premera and has already made 200
requests for spot contract coverage for patients, compared with four spot
contracts in the past. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State
Office of the Ins. Commr Mar. 14, 2014) (order on motion for partial summary
judgment) at 45, available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-order-sch-m
sj.pdf. Of these 200 requests, Seattle Childrens says that only 21 have been
approved, 8 have been denied, and the remainder have not been settled, which
certainly poses a concern about the rapidity if not frequency with which such
claims can or will be approved. Id.
242. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 29, 2014) (OICs opposition to motion for partial summary
judgment), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
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the regulations for QHP certification, they fulfill the 20% ECP
enrollment standard for 2014.243
The court ruled that there are genuine material issues of
fact as to whether the OIC properly considered the uniqueness
of Seattle Childrens services in certifying plans for the
exchange and agreed to hear oral arguments.244 The primary
relief that could be granted in such a case would be to
deauthorize the plans for listing on the exchange or fail to
reauthorize them in the future.245 However, this was rendered
unnecessary when, before oral arguments, both Premera and
Bridgespan agreed to cover Seattle Childrens in some
exchange plans, and Seattle Childrens dismissed their appeal
with prejudice.246 Meanwhile, new plans were approved for
/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-sch-msj-opp
osition-oic.pdf.
243. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014) (intervenors joint motion for summary judgment),
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings
/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-motion.pdf.
244. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 17, 2014) (motion for partial summary judgment), available
at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-
proceedings/documents/13-0293-sch-msj-motion.pdf. Premera and BridgeSpan
had argued that the issue of spot contracting has already been settled by the
Coordinated Care case but summary judgment was denied since that case only
applied state, and not federal, law. Likewise, the Coordinated Care case being
referred to and discussed above did not expressly allow networks to use spot
contracting to satisfy network adequacy. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-
0293 (Wash. State Office of the Ins. Commr Feb. 20, 2014) (order on
intervenors joint motion for summary judgment), available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-pro
ceedings/documents/13-0293-order-intervenors-msj.pdf.
245. The Exchange may at any time decertify a health plan if the
Exchange determines that the QHP issuer is no longer in compliance with the
general certification criteria . . . . Decertification of QHPs, 45 C.F.R. 155.1080
(2012). The Exchanges are also responsible for establishing processes for
decertification and appeal of decertification. Id. The Chief Presiding Officer for
the OIC has declared justiciability, noting that the case is asking whether
authorization of the health insurers was appropriate (not forcing insurers to
contract with the hospital) and also that OICs approval of insurance plans
have legal and regulatory affects which may implicate actual legal interests of
Seattle Childrens. See Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State
Office of the Ins. Commr Feb. 20, 2014) (order on OICs motion to dismiss),
available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings
/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-order-oic-motion-dismiss.pdf.
246. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Sept, 5 2014) (notice of withdrawal motion), available at
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/administrative-hearings/judicial-proc
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2015 with new state network adequacy standards in
Washington.247 The states insurance commissioner issued
these new standards removing provider-patient ratios and time
and distance standards, and adding specific types of care that
plans must cover.248 They require care that cannot be supplied
by the covered providers to be provided out-of-network at no
additional cost, and that plans have adequate staff to handle
medical necessity reviews.249 Lastly, the new language allows a
plan to contract with facilities outside of its area if such a
facility does not exist in the service area or if the plan shows a
good faith effort to contract with such entity.250 Spot contracts
must not be used to fill gaps in service, but are permissible in
unique situations where the care would typically occur out-of-
network and out of the service area.251
The details of the Seattle Childrens settlement are not
public, but the decision by insurers to ultimately include
Seattle Childrens in-network might reflect consumer
preference, insurer avoidance of litigation or harmful publicity,
a realization that Seattle Childrens services were unique and
spot contracts were to be covered frequently enough to be more
cost-effective if provided in-network, or a reaction to perceived
strictness in the new state insurance standards. Unfortunately,
without a hearing, the case provides little guidance for future
litigation. Yet, the issues it presents are not unique, and
Seattle Childrens case raises a number of distinct questions
that network adequacy law does not reach but could be raised
in other exchange years. The current law is confined to
questions of geographic distance and generally whether there
eedings/documents/13-0293-order-dismissal.pdf; Enroll with Care, SEATTLE
CHILDRENS, http://www.enrollwithcare.org/#plans (last visited Sept. 30,
2014).
247. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMMR, RULE-MAKING ORDER
CR-103P (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/legislation-rules/recently-adopted-rules/documents/2013-22103P.pdf.
248. Id. This includes access to primary, ancillary, specialty, and
institutional services. The proposal also requires pediatric access to
designated pediatric specialties, such as rheumatology, oncology, and
cardiology. Id.
249. See id. The insurer must make known to the enrollees the referral and
authorization practices and the possible effect of limiting access. Id.
250. Id. This applies to pediatric community hospitals, tertiary centers,
specialty hospitals, transplant centers, and neonatal intensive care units. Id.
251. Id.
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are enough providers to deliver promised benefits.252 Seattle
Childrens suggests that, to the extent that narrow networks
exclude tertiary and acute care providers, network adequacy is
also about the availability of specialized services that some
patients need, the ability of providers to coordinate that
specialized care, and the quality and experience of those
providers.253
2. Other Cases with Network Adequacy Implications
Network adequacy issues are cropping up in other states,
raising different issues than Seattle Childrens. One case
emphasizes the likelihood that some insurers will find narrow
networks so effective, they might not wish to provide broad
ones.254 In July 2013, Maines Superintendent of Insurance
approved two narrow networks put forth by Anthem Blue Cross
and Blue Shield for offering on the exchange.255 The Bureau of
252. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Request for Approval of Access
Plans, No. INS-13-801 (State of Me. Bureau of Ins. July 25, 2013) (decision
and order), available at http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/AnthemBC-2013
/PDF/Decision_and_Order.pdf (In particular, Paragraph 7(A)(3) [of Insurance
Rule 850, Section 7] requires a carriers access plan to include: Written
standards for providing a network that is sufficient in numbers and types of
providers to assure that all services to covered persons will be reasonably
accessible without unreasonable delay. Standards must be realistic for the
community, the delivery system, and clinical safety. In establishing these
standards, the carrier may incorporate standards published by independent
standard-setting organizations and approved by the Superintendent. In
addition, specific criteria on the number and geographic distribution of
providers and practitioners are set forth in Rule 850(7).).
253. Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 29, 2014) (opposition to intervenors joint motion for
summary judgment), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/administrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-sch
-opposition.pdf.
254. See infra notes 25565 and accompanying text.
255. Maines state statute calls for a reasonable access to health care
services and specifically defines provider-patient ratios to achieve this
purpose. See supra note 252. However, while it also had a geographic access
standard that specifically articulated driving distances to primary care,
specialty care, and hospitals, this provision was repealed in 2011. See H.P.
979, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0979&item=
1&snum=125 (repealing specific mileage provisions). Nonetheless, the
Superintendent indicated that even though there is no longer a statutory
driving requirement, geographic considerations are still relevant in
determining network adequacy. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Request
for Approval of Access Plans, supra note 252.
110 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 16:1
Insurances analysis of network adequacy focused on whether
there were sufficient numbers of general and specialty
providers given anticipated enrollment, state-defined provider-
patient ratios, and the geographic disbursement of these
providers.256 Like the Seattle Childrens case, a popular
tertiary hospital was excluded from Anthems plans.257
However, the Superintendent found it was reasonable to select
one of the two tertiary hospitals for the southern part of the
state, given that only one exists in the north.258 The
Superintendent explained:
The question is not how the proposed HMO network compares to a
hypothetical network including every hospital in Maine. It is
whether the proposed HMO network contains enough providers over
a wide enough area to provide reasonable access to health care
services to members. If the access provided is reasonable, it is
irrelevant that the network could be bigger or better.259
Post-certification, Anthem proposed to cease offering its
broader-network plans and to migrate policyholders to
narrower plans.260 Anthem found that allowing its broad
network to exist beside its narrow one compromised its ability
to offer large enough streams of patients to negotiate lower
reimbursement rates from in-network providers.261 The
Superintendent denied this request by applying a best
interests standard.262 With this new narrow network, the
enrollees choice of providers could be heavily restricted
compared to their old plan and patients presumably might
256. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Request for Approval of Access
Plans, supra note 252.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. Note the similarity of this standard to federal ones.
260. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Request to Discontinue
Individual Health Plans, No. INS-13-803 (State of Me. Bureau of Ins. Oct. 4,
2013) (decision and order), available at http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance
/Anthem_INS-803_2013/PDF/Decision_and_Order.pdf.
261. See id.
262. Id. Of note in the decision to refuse this latest Anthem effort, the
Superintendent used a best interest standard as compared to a reasonable
access standard in its first Anthem analysis. The best interests standard
prohibits carriers from discontinuing a guaranteed-renewable plan unless it
replaces it with a plan that meets certain requirements and the Insurance
Superintendent finds that the new replacement is in the best interests of the
policyholders. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2850B(3)(G)(3)(a) (2014).
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have to switch providers.263 While the narrow plan would be
cheaper for consumers, these enrollees had already purchased
broader plans and had expectations linked to that.264 Nothing
in the ruling, however, prevented Anthem from encouraging
policyholders to purchase narrow networks plans or to not offer
broad networks in the future.265
In New Hampshire, network adequacy questions were
particularly pronounced, as Anthem Blue Cross and Blue
Shield was the only insurer to offer plans on the exchange for
2014.266 Anthems network included sixteen of the states
twenty-six hospitals, leaving the remaining hospitals
unavailable to those buying insurance on the exchange.267 The
New Hampshire Insurance Department established working
groups to review network adequacy criteria in the state.268
Current state law follows the federal standard, with additional
time and distance, wait time, and specialty care standards.269
263. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Request to Discontinue
Individual Health Plans, supra note 260. Especially given that Anthems
narrow network only covers six out of twenty hospitals in Southern Maine. Id.
at 11.
264. Id.
265. See id.
266. Jan, supra note 80.
267. Id. Anthem representatives state the plan is adequate within the
regulations, as specialists are within a one-hour drive for 90% of enrollees. Id.
The network also covers 77% of the states primary care doctors and 87% of its
specialists. Id. Because of the narrower network, premiums are 30% cheaper.
Id. At least one county does not have a hospital in-network and several of the
hospitals excluded from the network claim that Anthem never approached
them or tried to contract with them and that they would have accepted
Anthems rates if they had. Id.
268. N.H. INS. DEPT, NETWORK ADEQUACY: BALANCING COST AND ACCESS
(2014), available at http://www.nh.gov/insurance/consumers/documents/netw
_adeq_hrngslds.pdf.
269. New Hampshire law dictates that a managed care plan shall
maintain a network of primary care providers, specialists, institutional
providers, and other ancillary health care personnel that is sufficient in
numbers, types and geographic location of providers to ensure that all covered
health care services are accessible to covered persons without unreasonable
delay. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. INS. 2701.04 (2014). The law specifies time
and distance standards of two primary care providers within fifteen miles of
90% of the enrollees or access to specialists within forty-five miles for 90% of
enrollees. Id. at 2701.06. The law also requires availability of certain
specialists, for example allergists, cardiologists, general surgeons,
neurologists, obstetrician/gynecologists, oncologists, ophthalmologists,
orthopedists, otolaryngologists, psychiatrists, and urologists. Id. Other
specialties like plastic surgery are also required but can be further
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The New Hampshire Insurance Department stresses that what
its laws do not do is either: (1) force a plan to contract with
any particular provider or (2) guarantee access to any
particular provider for any particular patient.270 Its underlying
goal is to preserve the ability of plans to compete via networks
within government constraints.271
The issue of narrow networks is also indirectly implicated
in Fairfield County Medical Assn v. United Healthcare of New
England, where associations representing Medicare physicians
sued Medicare Advantage insurers for terminating physician
positions allegedly without substantive and procedural due
process protections afforded by Medicare.272 Americas Health
Insurance Plans (AHIP), the national trade association
representing insurance companies, has filed an amicus brief
arguing for the right of insurance companies to establish
narrow networks and the right of patients to seek more
affordable premiums.273 They suggest the need to compete for
customers will ensure that narrow networks do not compromise
access to necessary care.274
Network adequacy laws to date appear to concentrate on
safety net access for the poor and some reasonable access to
primary and secondary care through provider ratios, time and
distance standards, and other requirements.275 But insurance
courts having to apply these standards in practice are being
presented with additional questions that network adequacy
laws do not explicitly address. To what extent is spot
contracting appropriate for tertiary and specialty care? To what
extent should network adequacy consider quality and
experience of the provider? And what is the appropriate
standard to review network adequacy? Moving forward, both
academic medical centers and the public will likely mount
geographically. Id. The state requires plans to follow set standards for wait
time. Id. at 2701.07.
270. N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268.
271. Id.
272. See generally Brief of Americas Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellants at 1522, Fairfield Cnty. Med. Assn. v. United
Healthcare of New England, 985 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Conn. 2013) (No. 3:13-cv-
1621) (presenting arguments in favor of Medicare Advantage insurers).
273. Id. at 1.
274. Id. at 1214.
275. Id. at 8.
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pressure on the states to further define the boundaries of
network adequacy in the face of ongoing insurance reform.
V. ETHICAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY NARROW
NETWORKS
Narrow networks present a number of ethical and legal
challenges for patient care, especially access to tertiary care
given that it is often life-saving, typically constitutes an
essential health benefit, and is not currently being considered
in the law despite the providers of such care being most
frequently excluded from narrow networks.276 Narrow
networks also present a preference issue, a matter of wanting
to keep ones doctor despite in-network providers that are
available and capable of performing the required medical
service.277 To the extent that preference issues may prevent
patients from seeking or receiving sufficient medical care, they
may warrant additional exploration in the future. However,
this Article focuses on access to tertiary care as a more
immediate and problematic issue. The need for guaranteed
tertiary access, and the increased cost presumably associated
276. See generally White et al., supra note 24, at 32930 (discussing the
benefits of tertiary care). Within this access group, there are the individuals
with a known illness whose providers are not available through any plan on
the exchange. Also, there are individuals who knowingly enrolled in a narrow
network, but later require care in which a broader network would be
preferred. And, presumably, there are individuals who enroll without realizing
the limitations of the network (an educational issue, which requires different
policy approaches). Lastly, there are individuals, like children, who do not
have a say in what plan they are enrolled. Knowingly selecting a narrow
network may or may not impact the individuals right to a broader network
provider from an ethical perspective. Daniels distinguishes those who wander
into an unlucky path through no fault of their own as bad brute luck
whereas those who make a bad choice have bad option luck. Norman
Daniels, Justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 45 (2001).
While there is an argument that those who suffer misfortune through no fault
of their own are worthy of aid from others while those with a choice are not,
Daniels argues that gives too much centrality to our choices, which is not ideal
if we want to protect the freedom to make decisions for a democratic society.
Id. However, allowing everyone access despite not having paid for it or
selected it might pose a free rider problem, where people only jump to heftier
plans when they know they need it. Id. at 67. This poses a much larger
ethical debate to be discussed in further research.
277. It has been a prominent complaint in the media as insurers on the
exchanges failed to contract with providers whom patients and communities
had long-standing relationships. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 1.
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with it, poses distinct ethical challenges and merits individual
attention.
A. NARROWNETWORKS PLACE TENSIONS ON PATIENT ACCESS TO
TERTIARY CARE
We will assume for the purposes of this Article that the
types of care being requested in cases like Seattle Childrens
are covered benefits under the insurance plans.278 If so, the
question becomes not about covered benefits, but about the
providers that provide them and whether, and how, plans must
contract with these providers to satisfy benefits and network
adequacy requirements.
Patients like Gabriella may be left with few choices
without additional regulation.279 Hopefully, a plan that
contracts with the academic medical center is available on the
exchange and not cost-prohibitive. If not, the experience of
providing care might be very fractured and uncoordinated,
posing quality, safety, and convenience concerns.280 She may be
forced to see a variety of specialists in many different health
systems and locations, some in-network and, perhaps, some
spot contracted for out-of-network, while facing uncertainty
about what care is covered and what must be paid for out-of-
pocket.281 It would certainly be more difficult for these
providers to communicate with one another, share chart notes,
coordinate both short and long term care plans, and to access
Gabriellas tests and records.282 If Gabriella required
hospitalization, her current specialists might not be part of
278. The essential benefits standard requires coverage for hospitalization,
pediatric care, rehabilitative care, mental health treatment, and other care,
which may at times require tertiary or acute level care. Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (b)(1) (2012). See generally
Press Release, supra note 2 (discussing the treatments denied by non-contract
exchange plans).
279. Chen, supra note 1.
280. See Press Release, supra note 2.
281. See id.; Chen, supra note 1.
282. See generally Sara L. Toomey et al., Disparities in Unmet Need for
Care Coordination: The National Survey of Childrens Health, 131 PEDIATRICS
217, 217 (2013) (A considerable proportion of parents reported unmet care
coordination needs for their children, especially parents of children with
special health care needs.). A 2013 Pediatrics study found that 41% of
parents report that their children have needed care coordination. Id. at 219
20. Coordination issues were higher in children with special health care needs
(41% versus 26%). Id. at 220.
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that system and the hospital may not even have certain
specialties on staff or within Gabriellas network.283 The
institutions may have significantly less experience with cases
like Gabriellas for even non-unique care if her comorbidities
make delivery of primary and secondary care more complex.
And some of the institutions may not be equipped to handle a
large influx of complex and comorbid patients, if they are used
to major academic medical centers handling them. Meanwhile,
her mother might have to drive a sick child perhaps hundreds
of miles284 while an experienced institution housing all of these
specialties may be in her backyard.285 Spot contracts for unique
services could be an administrative and time burden for
patients, provides, and insurers.286 And the mother, who in the
283. Chen, supra note 1. This is not to suggest that all hospitals would be
incapable of specialty care. Individual specialists outside of major health care
systems may be excellent and may see large caseloads. This is more to suggest
that the vast majority of tertiary and acute care is typically provided in large
health care systems, where care is more easily coordinated. See generally
White et al., supra note 24, at 32435, 330 (evaluating a study on high-priced
hospitals and whether they provide significantly different care options than
lower-priced hospitals).
284. In writing this I was particularly driven by my bedside ethics
consultation work at the Cleveland Clinic and other Cleveland area hospitals,
as well as a number of years volunteering in and observing at Childrens
Hospital in Pittsburgh. It was common practice for many patients, for example
those with cystic fibrosis or sickle cell, to come in for tune-ups or periods of
time where they were hospitalized to manage their chronic conditions in the
hopes of avoiding larger, more dangerous, and more costly acute interventions.
Often such patients would see a whole team of physicians over a period of a
week or more, with that team knowing one another and the patient
intimately. The value of such coordination may be difficult to quantify but it is
difficult to imagine it happening outside of a tertiary or quaternary center, or
the impact on many of these chronically ill patients without such coordination.
See generally Toomey et al., supra note 282, at 221 (discussing the need for
effective care coordination for children with special health care needs).
285. Particularly striking in the Seattle Childrens case is the question of
access when a top institution is in ones backyard. See, e.g., Chen, supra note
1. It recalls the imagery of Roald Dahls Charlie and the Chocolate Factory,
with poor Charlie Bucket whose family could not afford to buy him candy, but
where one awful thing that tortured little Charlie, the lover of chocolate,
more than anything else . . . . It was the most terrible torturing thing you
could imagine, and it was this: In the town itself, actually within sight of the
house in which Charlie lived, there was an enormous chocolate factory!
ROALD DAHL, CHARLIE AND THE CHOCOLATE FACTORY 7 (Bantam Books 1984)
(1964).
286. See Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State Office of the
Ins. Commr Jan. 29, 2014) (opposition to intervenors joint motion for
summary judgment), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/ad
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immediate must decide when to take her child for care and
where, is not well positioned to know what counts as unique.287
While state and federal laws discuss reasonable access to
providers, they clearly do not address precisely how these plans
must contract with such providers.288 Certainly, nothing in the
law requires that care be coordinated or that networks contract
with high quality providers, high volume providers, ones with
unique services, or ones with the greatest experience.289 Thus,
it becomes a question of whether these plans must contract
with the providers clearly designed to perform these services,
or whether they can piece together access through spot
contracting, coverage for only unique services, and other
mechanisms.
But are narrow networks problematic or justified if, by
compromising access to academic medical centers, they
increase access to affordable insurance for the population more
broadly? To consider this ethical dilemma, we must look to the
purposes of health insurance, our health care system, and the
PPACA.
B. AN ARGUMENT FOR EMPHASIZING TERTIARY CARE IN
NETWORK ADEQUACY LAWS
Health insurance now occupies two important and
somewhat distinct goals. It pays for basic care and it pools risk
for larger and unanticipated costs of illness.290 Whether one
looks at health insurance as promoting health, protecting
wealth, or compensating those that suffer bad luck, access to
ministrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-int-msj-sch-opp
osition.pdf; see also Seattle Childrens Hospital, No. 13-0293 (Wash. State
Office of the Ins. Commr Mar. 14, 2014) (order on motion for partial summary
judgment), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/admin
istrative-hearings/judicial-proceedings/documents/13-0293-order-sch-msj.pdf.
287. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 1 (discussing Rebekah Blankers inability
to determine where to go to get her daughters care needs met).
288. See generally Brief of Americas Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellants, supra note 272 (highlighting reasonable access as a
common requirement for most states).
289. See generally id. at 811 (discussing federal law adequacy
requirements).
290. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The
Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1873, 187579 (2011).
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high-quality tertiary care implicates all of these functions.291
The chronic and/or costly interventions associated with tertiary
care are the very health care costs for which even the very
wealthy might not have access to without insurance.292
Network adequacy is not a debate about access to health
insurance, but access to health care.293 As a vehicle for paying
for and delivering health care, Deborah Stone argues that
success in insurance should be measured by how it treats the
sick.294 Sharona Hoffman favors a system where more serious
and chronic illnesses take precedence over more minor
conditions, in favor of a medical system that saves lives,
restores functionality, or diminishes the consequences of
lasting disability.295 Norman Daniels argues that the central
291. Id. at 1873. Hoffman frames it as three functions: health promotion
(where insurance cost-effectively promotes health), financial security (where
insurance protects individuals from devastating financial loss), and brute luck
(where insurance protects against chance and unavoidable risks). Id. She
provides strong examples of how the PPACA adopts each model in its
insurance reforms. Id. at 1874. For example, it covers preventive care to
address health promotion, it limits cost sharing to address financial security,
and it covers preexisting conditions for brute luck. Id. at 187679.
292. See generally id. at 187981 (discussing the expense of such care
without insurance).
293. Timothy Stoltzfust Jost, Health Care Access in the United States.
Conflicting Concepts of Justice and Little Solidarity, 27 MED. & L. 605, 607
(2008) ([T]he ultimate issue here is access to health care, not insurance . . . .
Just because a person is uninsured does not mean that he has no access to
health care.).
294. Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy
Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 652 (2008). In fact, Stone reminds us that
in other countries health insurance is called sickness insurance, keeping the
issue closer to mind. Id. Threaded through these debates is the larger question
of health care rationing. For example, does basic access to care generate
greater net benefits than tertiary care for a few? Should we preference greater
net benefits or those with most medical need? In essence, it is a larger debate
about basic, affordable care versus high tech, expensive care. This Article need
not reach to these issues, however, as this is more an argument of some level
of access to tertiary care than of which should be favored over another. See
Norman Daniels, Rationing Fairly: Programmatic Considerations, 7
BIOETHICS 224, 22425 (1993) (discussing rationing in health care); Leonard
M. Fleck, Last Chance Therapies: Can a Just and Caring Society Do Health
Care Rationing When Life Itself Is at Stake?, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POLY L. &
ETHICS 255, 255 (2002) (examining last chance therapy rationing in health
care).
295. Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in
Health Care Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 689 (2003). Hoffman also highlights a
number of ways in which moral fairness might be considered, whether by
ensuring equal access to resources, equal overall welfare, equal opportunity,
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moral purpose of health care is maintaining normal human
function because it provides people with a reasonable
opportunity to meaningfully participate in society.296 In a just
society, he claims, this chance at opportunity should not fall
disproportionately on the ill and access should not be based on
ability to pay.297 As so many have argued in the past, the role
of health insurance and health care to our society is to restore
function and ensure opportunity, and one important way to
measure this is by how health insurance helps the very sick.298
Within this framework, access to tertiary care (and by virtue of
this, sometimes access to academic medical centers or other
like providers) is imperative and no less important than access
to basic care. Those in need of intensive specialty care may well
be the very sickest in society, those most in need of being
restored, and those who most severely lack opportunity without
intervention.
Alternatively, health insurance can be viewed as a social
and economic contract with a larger role of managing risk,
facilitating commerce, encouraging socially desirable activity,
and protecting the public.299 In this context, what we insure
and who pays for it says something about how we shape and
perceive certain risks in our society.300 Health insurance,
through this lens, invites moral contemplation about questions
of suffering, compassion, and responsibility.301 To not
promoting net health benefits, or ensuring adequate participation in the
processes that allocate resources. Id.
296. Daniels, supra note 276, at 3.
297. Id. at 4.
298. Id. at 3; Stone, supra note 294, at 652. Stone argues that the very
experience of unequal insurance coverage becomes an adverse event and
insurance becomes a tool to remedy inequality in a just democracy. Stone,
supra note 43, at 40.
299. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and
Social Institution, 51 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1489, 1510 (2010).
300. Mariner, supra note 37, at 27679. As Stone argues, insurance creates
a social norm that communities are responsible for alleviating certain defined
harms for individuals and, through this, creates expectations for well-being.
Stone, supra note 43, at 1617; see also Stempel, supra note 299, at 151012
(discussing the societal values and risk of insurance policies).
301. Stone, supra note 43, at 16. In a different piece, Stone suggests that a
lessening of social insurance and social welfare may reflect a larger culture
shift in society where people and their health care, retirement plans, etc. are
viewed as economic sinkholes and losses rather than investmentsThe
people, the nations citizens, are no longer a precious national asset, but
voracious predators on the common weal. Deborah Stone, Managed Care and
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adequately ensure some level of predictable access to tertiary
care seems to run counter to this notion, as tertiary care seems
to harbor the very suffering for which we as a society most
sympathize with and fear.
In the past there have been arguments that there are no
moral claims to treatment because there were no universal
statements of what anyone was owed by virtue of being
insured.302 Insurance was seen as a contract where the insured
accepts whatever benefits the insurer agrees to, with
significant variation across different plans.303 Yet this was
before the PPACA presumably sought to provide some
meaningful level of health insurance (and health care) to
everyone at some reasonable cost.304
No longer is there uncertainty about what insurers owe.
Essential benefits, for example, define a benchmark for the
minimal benefits that insurers owe to their insureds.305 In this
way, network adequacy can be seen not as a debate about what
is narrow and what is broad, but about what was promised by
the PPACA (and, in turn, the insurance companies) and
whether it was delivered. This claim does not to extend a right
to health care to all; it confines it to those who purchase health
the Second Great Transformation, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 1213, 1215
(1999).
302. E.g., Allen Buchanan, Managed Care: Rationing Without Justice, but
Not Unjustly, 23 J. HEALTH POLY & L. 617, 618, 624 (1998) (The lack of . . . a
societal agreement on what the entitlement to health care
includes . . . undercuts the very assumptions under which the current ethical
debate about rationing in managed care is conducted.).
303. Id. at 62526.
304. A full legislative history of the PPACA and its many-layered goals is
unnecessary for the purposes of this Article, but common sense dictates that
the PPACA, in name at least, intended to make care affordable but also to
protect patients, through the use of a variety of insurance reforms. John
Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act: How Legislative
Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 13334 (2013).
One might argue whether this means ensuring affordable access to basic care
for everybody or also more expensive and complex care for the few who require
it. Other scholars have noted the complexity and multi-factorial legislative
history of the PPACA, noting that a true examination of the goals of the law
may go back to broader discussions of health reform in the George W. Bush
era or even before. Id. at 136. See id. at 13759 for a broader discussion of the
challenges presented by PPACAs legislative history.
305. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. §18022
(2012).
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insurance.306 But for those who make the purchase and trust
the system, the PPACA forces the insurer to uphold the trust
that the insured is making a good bet and that insurance will
be useful when it is needed.307
Much of insurance reform under the PPACA (and state
reforms before it) targeted exactly the insurance practices that
rendered health insurance useless for the sick.308 By
purchasing insurance, it must now meet some basic level of
benefits, at some limited amount of out-of-pocket cost.309 It
must be extended even to the sick, and it cannot be taken away
when the individual finally needs it.310 The underlying
considerations here are to render insurance capable of being
meaningful for the sick and to make insurance an item worth
purchasing. Weak network adequacy laws that do not
contemplate the care most needed by the very sick can erode
that trust and threaten that willingness to pay into the
system.311
Without greater regulation of network adequacy to clearly
address the inclusion of tertiary care providers, insurance
might naturally split into two streams: (1) smaller numbers of
plans with broad access to academic medical centers (and thus
tertiary and acute care) that are more costly (and perhaps cost-
prohibitive), and (2) growing numbers of cheaper plans with
narrow provider networks that exclude academic medical
centers.312 To the extent that this split compromises access to
medically necessary care for the very sick, it is problematic.
306. Health Reform, supra note 40, at 43940.
307. Another way to look at this is with the insurer as the protector of a
common fund. Insureds place their trust in the insurer to guard the common
pool of resources unless and until the one with the valid claim needs it, but
otherwise to secure it from unworthy claims. Deborah A. Stone, Promises and
Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1435, 144045 (1994).
308. Health Reform, supra note 40, at 43940.
309. Id.
310. Id. As Mariner notes, virtually all bills considered by congressional
committees during the development of the PPACA prohibited insurers from
discriminating on the basis of preexisting condition or health status. Id.
311. See generally id. at 440 n.28 (A recent poll of public opinions of the
2009 House and Senate Bills find that 63% of those surveyed favor provisions
that prohibit insurers from denying coverage on the basis of health
conditions.).
312. See also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 23 (discussing access
to academic medical centers).
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But who should bear the presumed added cost associated with
ensuring higher-level care for those who need it?
C. WHO BEARS THE COST OF BROADENED ACCESS?
Narrow networks raise a question of distributive justice
around who should pay for care for the sickest.313 When asked
who should pay to cover the very sick, a number of answers
might spring forth, such as the insurers, the providers, or the
taxpayers. These all warrant important policy consideration.
But, I will focus on a group most people would not typically
consider: the other insureds.
Narrow networks trade provider choice for cheaper
premiums.314 For most consumers, this is a good calculus and
they will gladly trade their choice of provider for money
saved.315 Some may even argue it is a right of these consumers
to trade their health for low premiums, as the insurance
advocacy group did in the Fairfield amicus brief.316 But a
counter-narrative suggests that nobody has a right to cheap
premiums on the backs of the sick.317
Deborah Stone struggled with a similar question during
the height of the managed care era where she seminally
characterized the practice of medical underwriting as the
struggle over the soul of health insurance.318 Stone framed the
political debate over health insurance in the United States as
two distinct and competing visions of distributive justice:
actuarial fairness and the solidarity principle.319 Actuarial
313. As Smith nicely clarifies, [d]istributive justice pertains to what is
owed by society to its members in the microallocation of health resources
while general justice charts what a proper standard of obligation and use is for
individuals in the macro sense of sustaining the common or communal good.
George P. Smith, Social Justice and Health Care Management: An Elusive
Quest, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POLY 1, 7 (2008). Throughout this Article, the
question of distributive justice might implicate decisions about how all plans
must distribute their resources as well as individual questions of justice, as to
when a plan makes a decision about access to care for a single individual. Id.
at 57.
314. Pear, supra note 18.
315. See generally Burns, supra note 80 (discussing how narrow networks
result in substantial savings, which attract consumers).
316. Brief of Americas Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants, supra note 272.
317. Stone, supra note 37, at 28890.
318. Id. at 30814.
319. Id. at 289.
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fairness, at its simplest, means that each individual pays for
his or her own risk.320 Insurance under the solidarity principle,
however, operates as a form of social insuranceeveryone
must chip in a certain amount to ensure that all have access to
medically necessary health care.321 Admittedly, many
consumers do not purchase insurance for altruistic reasons or
out of a sense of social responsibility. Rather, they try to obtain
maximum protection for the cheapest rate, to their own
advantage.322 Nonetheless, as Crossley notes, their selfishness
still contributes to the common good:
In reality the contrast between social solidarity and individualism is
less stark. For even if an individual seeks to obtain health insurance
for the purely selfish purpose of protecting herself against the
possibility of overwhelming medical costs, by purchasing insurance
she enters into a community of risk sharers and thereby produces a
public benefit.323
For insurance to achieve its purpose as a social safety net
and form of mutual aid that would cover everyone, it simply
cannot be that everyone must pay their own way. Stone argued
that medical underwriting only served to emphasize peoples
differences rather than their similarities, allocating the burden
of health care costs across a few rather than on the whole.324
Likewise, narrow networks hold the same potential if they can
create affordable and adequate care for the healthy and
expensive or inadequate care for the sick.325 Without true
pooling of the risks associated with serious illness (even if it
requires tertiary care and even if the benefit accrues only to the
very few with the most expensive costs), narrow networks allow
health insurance to continue to treat the sick differently and to
320. Id. at 290.
321. Id. at 29091.
322. Hoffman, supra note 295, at 670.
323. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health
Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 80 (2005); accord Roberta M. Berry, The
Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY
205, 223 (1996); Brian J. Glenn, Risk, Insurance, and the Changing Nature of
Mutual Obligation, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 295, 29697 (2003).
324. Stone, supra note 37, at 28790.
325. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 35 (analyzing the risks
narrow networks may create for consumers).
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pile the costs of illness onto the very population that insurance
was designed to protect.326
Segregating the providers that the very sick require into
separate and more expensive plans is fair to the extent that the
healthy are entitled to enjoy their good luck through adequate
benefits and affordable premiums in ways that the sick are
not.327 The very system of insurance was designed to protect
the sick at the expense of the healthy, because of the
recognition that brute luck might strike anyone.328 So too,
anyone might need access to the highly specialized care that
network adequacy does not currently consider.329
The battle over who should pay what for their health care
goes back to early models of insurance.330 This struggling vision
between individual costs versus social good is endemic to
American society, where the concept of individual reliance and
rugged individualism butts up against the obligation to help
others.331 In fact, insurance is seen as a social good because it
legitimatizes the acceptance of some form of mutual aid, as the
individual paid something in return for his benefits.332
326. See Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing
Actually Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 355, 35759 (1997).
327. Hellman argues that price differences in insurance are only fair to the
extent that individuals are entitled to reap all the benefits of their good
fortune and good health at the cost of those who are less lucky. Id. at 398403.
328. Id.
329. When we enroll in insurance, we all face some chance that we will
become the individual who needs expensive care, even if we did not know it at
the time of enrollment. Anyone can become the individual who needs the
broad network. Moreover, good health is viewed as morally arbitrary,
meaning that illness is seen generally as luck of the draw and not some moral
punishment on the individual. Baker, supra note 37, at 37474, 39293
(contrasting higher rates paid by frequent-firers for unemployment insurance
versus higher rates of health insurance paid by victims of domestic violence).
330. For an interesting narrative, see Baker, supra note 37 (providing an
example of the young fighting against subsidizing the old in fraternal
organizations sickness insurance in Britains early nineteenth century). For a
discussion of the conflict between those who view health care as a social good
and those who view it as a commodity to be doled out based on ability to pay,
see Stone, supra note 37.
331. See Stone, supra note 43, at 4045 (Equality is one of the great
rallying cries in American politics.); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Adam,
Martin and John: Iconography, Infrastructure, and Americas Pathological
Inconsistency About Medical Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 229, 232 (2008)
(demonstrating this point through the imagery of John Wayne).
332. Stone, supra note 43, at 15.
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Besides our public system, the PPACA may be the closest
that our country has come to recognizing a moral mandate to
contribute to the overall cost of care for others through the
mandate to purchase insurance.333 The public is not unaware of
this debate and its moral implications, raising important
questions about whether it is just for individuals to subsidize
care they will never need or need no longer (e.g., a forty-six
year-old woman paying for obstetrics care).334
One might argue that this is a question of consumer choice
and consumer rights.335 Consumers should be free to vote on
which plan best suits their medical needs, often with the
sickest gravitating to the lowest cost-sharing while the
healthier gravitate to higher upfront cost.336 Yet, in reality,
individuals may not have a choice about a sufficiently broad
network, whether because the plan is not available on the
exchanges or because it is simply unaffordable, which may call
for separate but similar policy responses.337 Or individuals may
simply not realize when they enroll that certain providers are
not covered, a matter that can be resolved with greater public
education and familiarity with narrow networks.338 And in a
more general way, the ability of individuals to select the right
333. The label shared responsibility payment simultaneously expresses
an individual obligation to buy insurance and a collective obligation to
participate in a system in which everyone must share some responsibility for
ensuring affordable coverage. Brietta Clark, A Moral Mandate & the Meaning
of Choice: Conceiving the Affordable Care Act After NFIB, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POLY 267, 318 (2013). [T]he ACAs message is one of collective
aid, with a healthy dose of personal responsibility. Id. at 31819.
334. Compare Lori Gottlieb, Daring to Complain About Obamacare, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/opinion/daring-to
-complain-about-obamacare.html ([N]ow if I have Stage 4 cancer or need a
sex-change operation, Id be covered regardless of pre-existing conditions.
Never mind that the new provider network would eliminate coverage for my
and my sons long-term doctors and hospitals.), with id. (Yes, Im paying an
extra 200 a month, but Im okay with doing that so that others who need it can
have health care.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. James Surowiecki, Fifth Wheel: Extending Medicare, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2010/01/04/100104ta
_talk_surowiecki.
336. Some argue that consumer freedom to select a plan based on quality,
cost, and convenience considerations is the very raison dêtre for maintaining
the private insurance system. See generally id. (After all, measuring risk, and
setting prices accordingly, is the raison dêtre of a health-insurance
company.).
337. See supra Part III.BC.
338. See supra Part III.C.
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health care plan for themselves is debatable.339 Moreover, to
the extent that solidarity is important, there must be some
pooling of risks by insureds.340
Efforts in the future to regulate network adequacy must
balance all of these considerations and find a way to best
protect a host of health care consumers.
D. WHAT IF COVERAGE FOR THE FEW CONFLICTS WITH ACCESS
FOR THEMANY?
If managed care or insurers predictions provide any
insight, removing the insurers ability to negotiate prices by
requiring them to contract with tertiary providers could lead to
skyrocketing premiums for patients.341 What if these increases
are so high that they actually price individuals out of market or
make health insurance more expensive for everyone? Then, it is
no longer a matter of individuals purchasing cheap plans at the
expense of the sick. It is now a question of the inclusion of the
sick posing challenges for access to insurance for others. It
becomes a classic bird in hand problem. Is it better to provide
insurance to the people who we know need it for serious health
conditions or to individuals who certainly need it for its basic
339. This is for a variety of reasons, a number of which are well covered in
Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct
Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 1516 (2009); see Troy J. Oechsner &
Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74
ALB. L. REV. 241, 24452 (20102011); Deborah Stone, The False Promise of
Consumer Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 475, 47879 (2007).
340. Inherent in this is a question of whether we let consumers make (and
later pay for) bad choices, for example if they suffer access issues after buying
a narrow plan and then get sick. A true analysis is outside the scope of this
Article, but it bears mentioning that PPACA provisions only limit bad choices
to an extent (for example, only requiring smokers to pay one and a half times
as much in premiums as non-smokers). See ObamaCare Gives Smokers a New
Incentive to Quit, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare
-smokers/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). Moreover, the right to make bad
decisions and still be protected may be important to a democratic society. See
Daniels, supra note 276, at 5. Ultimately, if these consumers default on their
medical bills it becomes a social problem. The question then, is more aptly
framed as whether all plans offered on the exchanges offer adequate benefits,
not whether people have freedom to buy cheap but less useful plans. This logic
seems more in line with the broader goals of the PPACA and its market
regulations.
341. E.g., Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act:
CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J. 822, 84143 (2013).
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payer function and may or may not need it for more serious
conditions? Federal subsidies might take the burden of rising
premiums off of consumers but this added cost would have to
be accounted for elsewhere.
Narrow networks certainly seem to operate on a sort of
scale, where more extensive coverage for a few who are sick
could tip the scale toward costly coverage for the many and the
loss of the benefits of insurance for some.342 If this were proven
to be true, then there would need to be significant
considerations about these issues. But it is premature to say
that such a zero-sum equation exists without more empirical
evidence to suggest this and without other policy examinations
to decide whether costs can be preserved elsewhere.343
Yet assuming this were proven to be the case, it poses its
own distributive justice question, as overly stringent network
adequacy laws could then be critiqued for unfairly burdening
low-income groups with expenditures they may not otherwise
choose to make.344 In this way, mutual aid could be unjust if it
priced out the poor just as the system is unjust if it prices out
the sick.345
Where does one strike the balance between ensuring high
quality coordinated care even for the very sick and keeping
premiums low for everyones sake? Such questions circle back
to the larger questions of the role of health insurance and
health care to society and age-old questions about justifications
for high-technology care. Do we aim to cover all medically
necessary care at any cost or producing any outcome, necessary
342. See also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 5 (noting that [s]tates
seeking to address concerns about the adequacy of plans provider networks
while also constraining premium cost growth must engage in a balancing of
consumer protections with affordability).
343. Furrow provides an extensive analysis of other possible cost controls
set forth by the PPACA. See generally Furrow, supra note 341, at 84852.
344. Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy:
Antidote or Placebo?, 89 OR. L. REV. 811, 83839 (2011).
345. Arguments can be made that the insurance system, if no longer
burdening the sick, will automatically burden another group. For arguments
that social pooling may be inherently unfair for the young, who are less likely
to require medical care, see Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the
Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea
from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 82
(2010); Charles P. Litchfield, Note, Taxing Youth: Health Care Reform Writes
a Costly Prescription that Leaves the Young and Healthy Paying the Bill, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 353, 35460 (2012).
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medical care even if it is costly and acute, or care that restores
our normal functioning?346 Some argue that under a Rawlsian
theory of distributive justice, health care is a primary good
where unequal access is justified so long as those worst off
benefit,347 while others argue that health care should be
equally accessible to all,348 and still others argue that some
level of access to health care is part of an adequate standard of
living.349 Utilitarian, communitarian, egalitarian, and
libertarian approaches all might have some bearing on these
issues and lead us to different results.350 Of course none of
these standards can completely decide the issue as to what
extent individuals are owed a right to perhaps expensive, high
intervention care over individuals being given a right to basic
health care. Is it about cost, about saving lives, about restoring
function, or about greatest benefit to the greatest number?
While the PPACA defines essential health benefits that should
be made available to all through affordable insurance
packages, it does not resolve the larger question of what
adequate care is and larger questions of health care
rationing.351
346. Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
1449, 146768 (1994); Paul E. Kalb, Defining an Adequate Package of Health
Care Benefits, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1987, 199597 (1992).
347. Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of
Health Care, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 77, 80 (19931994) (citing ROBERT M.
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 26164 (1981)); see Allen E.
Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 55, 6062 (1984).
348. Stacy, supra note 347, at 87.
349. The level of adequate healthcare is important in this context, where
some individuals will require expensive and more frequent medical care than
others. Id. (citing VEATCH, supra note 347); see Buchanan, supra note 347; see
also David Copp, The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living: Justice,
Autonomy, and the Basic Needs, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS 231 (Ellen Frankel Paul
et al. eds., 1992).
350. For a comprehensive discussion of the various frameworks that inform
health ethics, policy, and law (and would be implicated in such a narrow
networks debate), see Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health, Capability, and Justice:
Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POLY 403, 40506 (2006).
351. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, What Is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional
Implications of Defining Medical Necessity and Essential Health Benefits
Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 445, 447 (2012) (This
controversy highlights the extraordinarily hazy contours around the definition
of health in a variety of legal and policy contexts and the significance of that
definition for future debates surrounding the ACA.).
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Moreover, some might argue that an overly stringent law
that requires plans to contract with tertiary providers could rob
the public of better quality benefits. As Enthoven notes in his
studies of managed competition that later became the forebear
to the PPACA, giving patients unlimited choice in providers
leaves them making poor choices about quality and robs the
plans from being able to negotiate with providers for cost and
quality considerations.352 One significant feature of the PPACA
is accountable care organizations (ACOs), which require
providers and plans to unite with a shared purpose to lower
prices, promote quality, and retain the savings associated with
doing so.353 ACOs by their very definition require select
contracting plans, and providers must be free to select others
who are committed to and capable of providing cost-conscious
high-quality care.354 To the extent that ACOs and managed
competition actually do promote quality and reduce overall
costs, limits on provider and plan freedom to contract may be
troubling for the larger system. And, of course, it highlights the
dilemma of whether and to what extent academic medical
centers and tertiary care can be easily streamlined into an
ACO, and the implications of this for patient care given the
unique services these institutions provide.355
A full account of the distributive justice issues raised by
narrow networks is beyond the scope of this Article and,
admittedly, a variety of different justice arguments would favor
352. Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed
Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24, 29 (Supp. 1993); see also Mark A. Hall, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (discussing Enthovens scholarship on
managed competition).
353. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service
-Payment/ACO/ (last updated Mar. 22, 2013).
354. See generally id. (Accountable Care Organizations . . . are groups of
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who come together
voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care to their Medicare patients.).
355. Academic medical centers may face cultural and financial barriers
with adopting an ACO model, especially given their added costs around
tertiary care, teaching, and research. While the pressure to form ACOs and
drop prices exists, academic medical centers have been less willing to adopt
the new model or less successful so far, as only 20% of the approved Medicare
Share Savings ACOs to date have been academic medical centers. Bill Toland,
Academic Hospitals, Research Units Face Accountable Care Cost Challenges,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 22, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.post-gazett
e.com/business/2014/07/23/Academic-hospitals-research-units-face-accountable
-care-cost-challenges/stories/201407250003.
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extending resources to a wide variety of different populations,
whether more resources for the sick, for the healthy, for the
largest net benefit, or for the greatest quality of life.356 Instead,
my purpose is to suggest that network adequacy poses a
distributive justice problem which policymaking processes need
to take into greater account.357
More information may be necessary to determine the
extent to which required contracts with tertiary care providers
could implicate the cost of care overall and access for others,
but certainly there is a strong normative argument to be made
that access to tertiary care is an important consideration and
that the costs of this care might be spread across the larger
pool of insurance.
VI. POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR NARROW NETWORKS
Time will tell whether narrow networks are a reaction to
more immediate and anticipated market instabilities or, more
likely, something longer lasting. Empirical studies will help to
reveal the positives and negatives of narrow networks for
patient care, insurance and health care access, and health care
costs and to what extent broad access could compromise the
ability of insurers to lower premiums. For now, we know that
narrow networks tend to exclude tertiary care centers, a
question that is not directly addressed in state or federal
law.358 More clarity is needed in the regulations to address the
problem raised by the Seattle Childrens casethat network
adequacy is not just an issue of care for rural patients or for
poor patients, but also for those rare patients who truly require
access to specialty care that cannot likely be provided
356. See generally Smith, supra note 313 (summarizing nicely a variety of
arguments around microallocation of resources).
357. Policymaking and political processes may be the only just way to
account for these distributive justice issues after all. As Daniels admits, once
we do the normative work of identifying a distributive justice tension,
reasonable people can disagree on where resources should be distributed. All
we can hope for is a transparent political process that fully considers all of the
issues. See Daniels, supra note 276, at 23, 89. Other scholars also recognize
the inherent place of health care rationing in allocation decisions and the
importance of a democratic process in promoting justice and avoiding invisible
rationing. Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic
Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 160104 (1992).
358. Chen, supra note 1.
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anywhere else.359 Any effort to regulate network adequacy
needs to find compromise between recognizing the unique and
necessary services that tertiary care centers provide while also
respecting that, with too stringent of network adequacy
standards, an insurer will be left with little or no power to
bargain down higher rates that may have little to do with
uniqueness and quality of care and more to do with market
share. A shared interest in lower premiums must be balanced
with the need to incentivize insurers to offer high quality care
and sufficient access.360
I make some tentative recommendations below for how to
address the more immediate tertiary care needs of patients
while we await more information about the implications of
network adequacy for a broad population of patients.
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
SHOULD PROTECT PATIENTS FROM BALANCE BILLING FOR
MEDICALLY NECESSARY OUT-OF-NETWORK CARE
Network adequacy questions are broad and encompass
access to primary, secondary, tertiary, and acute care. To the
extent that any of the services are essential health benefits,
plans should be held accountable for delivering that care to the
patient and, if it must be delivered out-of-network, it should
not result in any additional costs to the patient beyond what
the patient would have paid in-network. Particularly,
recognizing that few low- or medium-price hospitals provide
trauma care, neonatal intensive care, and other types of
tertiary care that patients require and which is often costly,
there should be standards in place that promise that such care
will be made available out-of-network without balance billing if
not available in-network.
Some states already have such a law, whether targeted at
managed care or not.361 So-called hold harmless laws are
limited, though, in whether they shield just the enrollees from
costs or also address payment for providers, and whether
359. See supra notes 114 and accompanying text.
360. CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
361. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE INS. COMMR, RULE-MAKING ORDER CR-
103P (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules
/legislation-rules/recently-adopted-rules/documents/2013-22103P.pdf.
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balance billing is prohibited only when the out-of-network care
is referred by an in-network provider.362
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: STATES AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SHOULD ADOPT A STANDARD TO ADDRESS
TERTIARY CARE
Network adequacy laws are strongest at the state level
where they can be better tailored to the particular needs and
resources of the state and local geography (e.g., the extent of
rural versus urban populations, the availability and number of
tertiary providers, and the number of insurers competing on
the exchange).363 The greatest impact on network adequacy can
be had at the state level where states might certify plans, have
or are developing their own laws, and have a greater
understanding of the needs of their citizens and their health
care markets.364 States can be used as laboratories to
experiment with a variety of network adequacy regulations as
we come to better understand narrow networks role in the new
marketplace and particular issues they pose for cost and
access.
These types of network adequacy issues require extensive
empirical, policy, and normative considerations. For example,
(1) do all exchanges offer some plan with access to academic
362. See, e.g., STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEPT, OGC OP. NO. 09-10-07, BALANCE
BILLING BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS (2009), available at http://www.dfs
.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2009/rg090404.htm (holding patients harmless for out-
of-network care referred by an in-network provider). For a list of relevant
state laws, see State Restriction Against Providers Balance Billing Managed
Care Enrollees, supra note 83.
363. See infra notes 38393 and accompanying text.
364. Much comes down to locality in health care anyway, particularly with
respect to quality. For example, plans have to meet certain measures of
quality set by local performance standards on national surveys of quality.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(c)(1)(D)(i), 42 U.S.C. §
18031 (2012) (requiring that health plans be accredited with respect to local
performance on clinical quality measures such as the Healthcare Effectiveness
Data and Information Set, patient experience ratings on a standardized
Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems survey, as well as
consumer access, utilization management, quality assurance, provider
credentialing, complaints and appeals, network adequacy and access, and
patient information programs by any entity recognized by the Secretary for
the accreditation of health insurance issuers or plans (so long as any such
entity has transparent and rigorous methodological and scoring criteria).).
Health plans also must implement quality improvement strategies. Id. at §
1311(c)(1)(E).
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medical centers, (2) how much price difference exists between
such plans and their narrow counterparts, and (3) how much
will it affect premiums if we ensure affordable access to
tertiary care for the sick? But meanwhile, patients like
Gabriella may be denied access to medically necessary care.365
We cannot wait until more is known about network adequacy
to ensure care for patients. Thus, I propose a standard for
consideration while we await information on narrow networks.
State legislative or administrative processes should
consider explicitly requiring some measure of tertiary care in
their network adequacy standards.366 A Massachusetts statute
on network adequacy provides a good starting place to address
the problems that cases like Gabriellas raise.367 Specifically, it
requires state insurance commissioners to evaluate the plan for
the range of services provided by providers in the plan and
plan benefits that recognize and provide for extraordinary
medical needs of members that may not be adequately dealt
with by providers within the plan network.368 These needs
should be provided at no additional cost to the patient
(compared to any in-network expense) when care is provided
out-of-network.369 Insurance officials should examine plans for
whether they satisfy this standard at all levels of care
(primary, secondary, tertiary, and acute). The burden can be on
the out-of-network provider to clarify the scope of their medical
services and the types of extraordinary medical needs that they
provide, whether by showing information about services,
patient populations, care coordination, and/or quality.370 The
Massachusetts statute provides good model language for states
365. Press Release, supra note 2; Chen, supra note 1.
366. See Hoffman, supra note 290, at 1873; see also Jost, supra note 293, at
607.
367. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176J, § 11 (2011); see also Chen, supra note
1.
368. 176J, § 11(e). This standard is in addition to the typical factors about
geographic location of providers, range of services, etc. that are present in
most other state and federal network adequacy regulations.
369. E.g., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 156, at pt. II.
370. The burden can be on the out-of-network provider to inform insurers
of when and how care for certain conditions can better be provided at their
institution, whether by showing information about care coordination and/or
quality. In selecting this standard, I recognize it will require adaptation. For
example, even the term medically necessary may face challenges. E.g., Hill,
supra note 351, at 44851 The goal is really to create some early standard to
emphasize access to tertiary care, until more can be known later.
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to consider because it recognizes the special needs of certain
patients and requires insurance plans to prepare for them in
advance.371 It also allows the insurance commissioner to
consider the plan through the lens of the very sick patient,
asking whether the plan can meet extraordinary needs which
ideally can encompass questions about access to tertiary and
acute care, access to coordinated care, and access to high
quality and experienced providers.372 Of course, much work
would be needed to define what an extraordinary medical need
is, but providers may play a useful role here in notifying both
plan and state insurance officials about the types of specialty
care they engage in and the types of patients they frequently
see to better inform this process.373
Ideally, any new laws or amendments will reach to the
unique services issue that Seattle Childrens raises, and also
will address more broadly questions of care coordination,
quality, and outcomes.374 Extraordinary medical needs should
be interpreted broadly to encompass episodes of care that
might better be performed in a tertiary center.375 For example,
Gabriellas extraordinary health needs might require that the
non-unique CT scan be performed out-of-network to facilitate
coordinated care among her many specialists. Or a surgery
might be regularly performed in-network but not on a patient
371. See id.; see also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
372. What this standard may not reach are issues of patients wanting to
keep their old doctor. Yet, arguably, the keep your old doctor issue may be
appropriately placed subordinate to ensuring that networks adequately cover
a host of necessary medical care, including tertiary care, at least until more is
known about the implications of more tightly regulating network adequacy.
Accommodating any and all requests to keep ones doctor will eliminate any
possibility of having a network. However, this is not to diminish the
importance of this issue for patient comfort and continuity of care. This is only
to say that, while network innovation is at its peak and exchanges remain
uncertain in their stability and success, we might favor more the call for
access over preference. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
373. See, e.g., N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268.
374. See Chen, supra note 1 (describing the unique services issue
surrounding Seattle Childrens); see also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at
68 (discussing the advantages of having clear quantitative standards); Hill,
supra note 351, at 44851 (analyzing the multiple definitions and concepts
concerning health); Press Release, supra note 2 (emphasizing the importance
of proper care coordination).
375. See, e.g., N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268; see also CORLETTE ET AL.,
supra note 29.
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with significant comorbidities.376 Insurance officials should be
careful that the standard is applied in a way that is not too
broad to allow claims for care that could easily and competently
be provided in-network, but not so restrictive that it creates
harmful access issues.377 Insurers might consider a similar
standard at the level of individual access decisions.378
Other models may be useful for states to consider, but have
some drawbacks. The NAIC Model Language requires plans to
cover out-of-network care at no extra cost when in-network
providers are insufficient.379 Yet this language could be
narrowly interpreted to reach only to availability, and not skill,
experience, or coordination.380 The Consumer Bill of Rights
language is closer (it requires plans to consider whether they
have providers with the appropriate degree of
specialization),381 but this only speaks to provider skill, and
not coordination, quality, or experience.382
At the very least, recognizing the issue in either
regulations or administrative cases can help to: (1) address the
issue of tertiary care which is not currently being actively
considered and (2) shift the decision of adequacy from the plans
and consumers who may want cheap premiums at any cost to
the state officials who may have fewer conflicts of interest.383
While tertiary care might highlight the issue, network
adequacy could also go further in considering the quality of
providers generally.384 The PPACA does have provisions
requiring that plans meet certain quality standards, but states
might also consider reviewing providers training, education,
and performance on quality measures.385 Quality matters at all
376. See generally Chen, supra note 1.
377. E.g., N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268; see also CORLETTE & VOLK,
supra note 21.
378. E.g., Brown & Hartung, supra note 85, at 2533.
379. NAIC MODEL ACT, supra note 155, at 74-4; see CONSUMER BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 156, at pt. II.
380. See generally Hill, supra note 351, at 44851 (discussing why skill,
experience, and coordination matter).
381. CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 156, at pt. II.
382. See generally Hill, supra note 351.
383. See Enthoven, supra note 352, at 29; see also Hall, supra note 352, at
5.
384. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 79.
385. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(c)(1)(D)(i), 42
U.S.C. § 18031 (2012); see also CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 69.
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care levels. Likewise, states can engage in frequent monitoring
for evidence of network inadequacy.386
States might consider applying numeric time and distance
standards to address tertiary access, though this could have
limited success. In the case of tertiary care where there are
likely few institutions available, numeric standards may be
difficult to create unless they involve a clear order to contract
with at least one tertiary hospital, or access to a tertiary
hospital within a certain distance (where available).387 States
must also weigh the benefits and burdens of prospective and
retrospective review of plans for network adequacy.388 In the
case of tertiary care, the latter may be preferable. Again, with
few tertiary centers, it is easy to see when one is being
excluded from a network and whether any other substitutes
apply.389 Moreover, the high stakes for some of these patients
may make retrospective review inappropriate.390
Notably, in some states, there will be an added issue of
rural health.391 Narrow networks may create distinct
challenges for rural health because of long distances to
386. Items that could be reviewed include balance billing data, whether
providers are actually accepting patients, numbers of times plans have to use
spot contracting, access to tertiary care generally, how many times they deny
or refuse spot contracting, quality of providers, patterns of exclusions, patient
grievances, and consequences for patient outcomes. See, e.g., CORLETTE ET AL.,
supra note 29; see also Abbi Coursolle, Network Adequacy in Medicaid
Managed Care: Recommendations for Advocates, NATL HEALTH L. PROGRAM
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/managed-care
/network-adequacy-in-medicaid-managed-care#.VDnr9_ldViI.
387. Finding a standard that makes sense for both rural and urban areas
of a state, reflecting numeric standards that actually work for the new and
somewhat unknown quantity that is the new purchaser on the exchange, the
reality that the review only captures one moment in time for the network and
not long term comings and goings of the network, and lack of training by state
insurance agencies to conduct these reviews are all possible drawbacks of the
numeric standard. However, subjective standards may not provide enough
guidance if insurers think a plan is adequate but providers and patients may
disagree. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
388. SeeMCCARTY & FARRIS, supra note 169.
389. E.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 23.
390. See generally Chen, supra note 1.
391. See Jean. A. Talbot et al., Rural Considerations in Establishing
Network Adequacy Standards for Qualified Health Plans in State and
Regional Health Insurance Exchanges, 29 J. RURAL HEALTH 327, 32728
(2013); see also Sidney D. Watson, Mending the Fabric of Small Town
America: Health Reform & Rural Economies, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 418
(2010).
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available providers, health professional shortages, higher
poverty rates than those found in urban areas, and higher rates
of uninsurance or underinsurance.392 Rural network adequacy
presents a different issue about how to bring health care
resources within geographic reach of everyone, calling for
larger evaluation of federal funding, physician education and
training, and the like.393
A federal floor is appropriate, in addition to state
regulation. More extensive federal regulation is unlikely to the
extent it might require Congressional activity. Agency action
seems more appropriate and feasible. While it may be
problematic to have too stringent of a federal standard that
removes freedom from the states,394 federal guidance can go
further in establishing a federal floor that sufficiently protects
the interests of the very sick and their need for specialty
care.395 For example, the CMS guidance should be amended to
also consider some other specialist providers like pediatric
institutions, particularly given the inability of children to have
a say in which type of health plan they are insured by.
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: MODELS TO OPERATIONALIZE A
TERTIARY CARE STANDARD
States may consider a variety of models in requiring plans
to contract, in some way, with tertiary providers as required to
meet extraordinary medical needs of enrollees.
One possibility is good-faith contracting or AWP standards,
which a number of states already have.396 In this manner, the
plan would be required to offer terms to all providers that a
392. Talbot et al., supra note 391, at 32728. Indeed, rural areas may face
network adequacy issues that have more to do with availability of providers in
general than with intentional marketing by insurers. In fact, too small of a
pool of providers may render narrow networking impossible in some areas.
Generally, for issues related to health reform and rural communities, see
Watson, supra note 391.
393. For example, see a complaint that, even with the 30% ECP standard
proposed by CMS, in Montana this could mean providers being as far as 300
miles away. Robert Pear, To Prevent Surprise Bills, New Health Law Rules
Could Widen Insurer Networks, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/07/20/us/insurers-face-new-health-law-rules-to-widen-network
s-and-prevent-surprise-bills.html.
394. See Enthoven, supra note 352; see also Hall, supra note 352.
395. See CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
396. Noble, supra note 215.
2015] NARROW NETWORKS 137
willing, similarly situated non-ECP provider either has or
would accept.397 Providers are free to either take the offer or
reject it; of course that similarly situated provider might need
to be found at a national rather than state level when looking
at tertiary care reimbursements.398 The ability of the plan to
exclude providers because they are expensive should have its
limits.399 If the provider is willing to accept the same rate as a
similarly situated provider, then the only excuse the insurer
has left is loss of the market share that could negotiate lower
premium prices. And this might be insufficient when we
consider the stakes for certain patients and for the possibility
that the volume of patients requiring access to tertiary care
could be relatively low for any single health plan. However,
states considering this option need to be sensitive to the
possibility that a requirement to contract will strip plans of the
ability to negotiate prices downward.400 To avoid this,
Massachusetts passed a law in 2010 in which hospitals cannot
bargain for preferred network status as a condition of their
participation in a network.401 Or, states might allow plans to
use centers of excellence outside of the state if they are
accessible to patients and meet quality standards, thus
widening competition and perhaps dropping prices.402
States can also encourage broader participation by
insurers on the individual market.403 This may be an
alternative way to keep premiums low without narrow
networks. Had all insurers that participated in the individual
market in 2011 chosen to participate in the 2014 exchange
market, researchers predict that premiums would have been
11.1% lower and federal subsidies would have dropped by 1.7
billion dollars.404 That reduction is comparable to rate savings
seen in the 2014 exchange year from narrow networks (where
narrow plans were 13% to 17% cheaper than broad
397. See, e.g., Letter to Issuers, supra note 184 (adopting the 2015
federally-facilitated exchange rule definition).
398. See id.
399. See N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268.
400. See Enthoven, supra note 352; see also Hall, supra note 352.
401. White et al., supra note 24, at 330.
402. E.g., CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
403. CORELETTE ET AL., supra note 29, at 47.
404. See, e.g., Gruber and Colleagues Call for More Research on Health
Plan Competition, supra note 110.
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counterparts).405 Of course, this is limited by the availability
and willingness of insurers. But states and federal agencies
might consider their role in stabilizing the market to welcome
more participants. For example, if insurers are reluctant to
contract with tertiary centers (whether through spot
contracting or some other means), states or the federal
government might consider removing the financial risk for the
insurer.406 Though there are many incentives for narrow
networks, contracting with specialty centers is almost certain
to increase the insurers pool of higher risk enrollees.407
Perhaps this is enough to discourage insurers from coverage.
Strengthening risk adjustment and gaining trust in the
insurers that it is effective in redistributing risk could be
imperative for encouraging insurers to broaden their
networks.408 Alternatively, states and the federal government
might consider requiring plans to purchase some form of
reinsurance that lumps all claims for tertiary and out-of-
network care. In this way, the insurers would share the burden
of patients with higher claims, helping to spread risk and
promote adequate coverage to tertiary care.
Another model would be to require plans to spot contract
for unique medically necessary services as in the Seattle
Childrens case.409 Such a requirement might allow for some
measure of access without destroying the insurers ability to
negotiate for prices410 (though admittedly if the service is
unique, they will have few other providers to negotiate with).411
But such an allowance does not resolve larger questions of
coordination of care and practical issues about how to handle a
whole hospital visit,412 for example in the case of the Blankers
family and the increased costs and impracticality associated
with attempting to treat a complex illness through a variety of
405. SeeMCKINSEY CTR., supra note 92, at 7.
406. See Greaney, supra note 344, at 839. See generally Furrow, supra note
341, at 84852.
407. E.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 23.
408. See N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268.
409. See Chen, supra note 1; see also Press Release, supra note 2.
410. See, e.g., N.H. INS. DEPT, supra note 268; see also CORLETTE ET AL.,
supra note 29.
411. See Greaney, supra note 344, at 839. See generally Furrow, supra note
341, at 84852.
412. See Hill, supra note 351, at 44851.
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different providers at once.413 Spot contracting might be an
answer, but only with certain transparency and other
protections in place for consumers and with a clear recognition
that the full course of care for the patient needs to be covered,
not just unique services.414 Models in managed care could be
illustrative here, particularly those that deal with last chance
or expensive therapies.415 Ombudsman and neutral third
parties to handle patient grievances may be a reasonable model
for addressing fair use of spot contracting at the individual
patient level.416
States might also consider their own ability to negotiate
prices. The PPACA is silent on whether exchanges should be a
clearinghouse, allowing all health plans that meet minimum
certification standards to be offered on the exchanges417 or,
alternatively, an active purchaser of health plans that uses
selective contracting, competitive bidding, and price
negotiation to impact price and quality.418 For 2014, seventeen
states ran their own exchanges.419 Of these, nine followed a
clearinghouse model,420 six were active purchasers,421 and two
413. Press Release, supra note 2; Chen, supra note 1.
414. See, e.g., CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29; see also Coursolle, supra
note 386.
415. E.g., Fleck, supra note 294.
416. For a discussion of models proposed in the managed care era to
address denials of expensive care for individuals, see Norman Daniels &
James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care: Pluralism, Fair
Procedures, and Legitimacy, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 27, 3337 (1998)
(stressing a theme of public engagement and legitimacy through transparent
public processes).
417. Minimum certification standards include accreditation, network
adequacy, essential community providers, marketing practices, quality
improvement, price and quality ratings, and transparency. See Quattrocki,
supra note 214; see also CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-
FACILITATED EXCHANGES 8 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO
/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/ffe-guidance-05-16-2012.pdf.
418. Betsy J. Rosen, Note, Procurement Law Governing the Certification of
Qualified Health Plans in Federally Facilitated Health Insurance Exchanges,
42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 847, 84858 (2013).
419. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insurance-exchanges/ (last
updated Nov. 4, 2014).
420. States following the clearinghouse model were Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, and
Washington. Id.
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were undecided.422 Federally facilitated exchanges chose a
clearinghouse model for 2014.423 Guidance for the 2015
exchanges again appears to be silent on the issue.424 Active
purchase states thus far have enjoyed the greatest competition
on the exchanges,425 but whether this was because of active
purchasing or because those states that felt most comfortable
with active purchasing had large competition anyway is
unclear. Active purchase states recruited insurers before
deciding which plans would be allowed on the exchanges.426 For
example, California approved eleven plans ultimately for
exchange purchase, but thirty-three plans originally applied.427
While federal guidance appears to be reluctant to move
toward active purchasing by the exchanges,428 such measures
could allow the exchanges to use their own market share to
improve cost and quality.429 The exchanges would act as a
gatekeeper in making insurers compete for quality of benefits
and network adequacy.430 Competitive bidding by the
exchanges would also be more in line with other government
contracting processes, which encourage open competition and
competitive bidding.431 Allowing active purchasing could mean
greater quality and easier purchasing for consumers.432
Currently in many markets, the exchanges are occupied by
large numbers of plans and consumers may find it difficult to
421. Active purchasers included California, Massachusetts, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
422. Undecided states were Kentucky and New Mexico. Id.
423. CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 417 ([A]t
least in the first year HHS intends to certify as a QHP any health plan that
meets all certification standards.).
424. To a lesser degree states can manage competition through rate
reviews, allowing plans to justify increased rates and, more aggressively, to
require plans to have their rates approved before the plan can be offered on
the exchanges. See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 110.
425. Id.
426. MCKINSEY CTR., supra note 105.
427. Some suspect that state run purchasers may seem more approachable,
quicker, and easier to work with than a federally facilitated exchange. See id.
428. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra note 417;
Rosen, supra note 418, at 85861.
429. See SCHONE & BROWN, supra note 67, at 1823.
430. Rosen, supra note 418, at 85861.
431. For example, Betsy Rosen points to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) as a model for how the exchanges might function. Id. at
85966.
432. Id.
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weed out quality plans from poorer quality.433 Moreover, with a
clearinghouse model, there may be a race to the bottom with
plans meeting the minimum certification standards, and then
competing only on price.434 Without consumers understanding
what they are buying, the plan does not need to compete on
quality.435 However, informed state exchanges could create a
minimum threshold for quality as well as cost in a way that
might be more realistic than consumer choice.
States so far have seemed reluctant to play too active of a
role in the insurance market,436 but they also have been dealing
with an uncertain market where insurers may not have been
willing to offer products on the exchange, at least until the
costs and health of enrollees was better known. This may
change over time as new insurers join and more old insurers
become willing to market products on the exchanges.437
D. RECOMMENDATION 4: TRANSPARENCY AND CONSUMER
EDUCATION
Individuals need information about network options in
order to make a choice that is best for their family, recognizes
their preferences, and anticipates their needs. Requiring
frequent updates to published provider networks and
transparency about whether the plan is a broad or narrow
design could go a long way in informing a consumer choice.438
Other options include giving special windows for new
enrollment if enrollees are not given adequate network
information, making information available about in- versus
out-of-network pricing,439 or even requiring plans to explicitly
mention if they have not contracted with certain types of
providers and instead plan to use spot contracting or other
methods.440
433. See Enthoven, supra note 352; see also Hall, supra note 352.
434. See generally CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, supra
note 417; Quattrocki, supra note 214.
435. See generally Enthoven, supra note 352; Hall, supra note 352.
436. See Rosen, supra note 418, at 85861.
437. For a summary of known market competition in states to date, see
CYNTHIA COX ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SIZING UP EXCHANGE MARKET
COMPETITION (2014), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2014/03/8562-sizing-up-exchange-market-competition1.pdf.
438. Pear, supra note 393.
439. See, e.g., CORLETTE ET AL., supra note 29.
440. See Coursolle, supra note 386.
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However, these measures are only useful to the extent that
individuals can make informed decisions about narrow
networks.441 Individuals cannot predict their future health
needs and they may have difficulty understanding the
implications of the narrow network. Moreover, like essential
health benefits, there is an argument to be made that plans
must be held to some accountable level of care and that
consumers, no matter how informed, should not be allowed to
purchase a bad plan. To the extent that a plan does not have
appropriate provider coverage for essential benefits, including
and especially tertiary care, it may well be that even the most
informed consumer should not be able to make such a
purchase.
VII. CONCLUSION
Network adequacy, in many ways, presents age-old
questions of health law, policy, and ethics. How do we
guarantee a system that protects everyone and controls cost?
The PPACA makes a valiant effort to make health care almost
universally available but, inevitably, it creates its own access
challengesboth expected and unanticipated. A single-payer
system could go a long way toward eliminating many of the
problems addressed in this Articleboth technical and broader
access concerns. But we must work in the system we currently
have. There are a variety of ways in which states, federal
governments, and the courts can improve network adequacy
while we await more information on the implications of narrow
networks for patient care and health care costs.
Narrow networks may pose important distributive justice
challenges about to what extent the healthy must pay for the
care of the sick and which we ought to favor: broader and more
affordable access to insurance for many and/or access to
necessary specialty care for a few. More normative and
empirical work is needed to inform these questions. Yet, while
we wait, real patients are finding that their insurance may not
deliver the benefits they need and serious consequences may
result. In this Article, I suggest that rapid response is
necessary to ensure access for patients to tertiary care. This
matter cannot wait until we know more about narrow
441. See generally Enthoven, supra note 352; Hall, supra note 352.
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networks, it must be acted upon now and adjusted as we gain
more knowledge.
***
